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Offensive Venue:
The Curious Use of Declaratory




Forum shopping is widespread in patent litigation because there are clear
differences in outcomes among the various federal districts. An accused patent
infringer that is sued in a particularly disadvantageous forum can file a mo-
tion to transfer to a more convenient forum, but the general consensus is that
such motions are difficult to win. Accordingly, accused infringers often file
declaratory judgment actions to forum shop. Such actions allow accused in-
fringers to preemptively sue the patent owner in the accused infringer’s pre-
ferred forum, and are considered by many to be the best way for accused
infringers to play the forum shopping game. Indeed, accused infringers file
substantial numbers of declaratory judgment actions every year. This Article
presents new evidence confirming that declaratory judgment actions are often
filed to forum shop.  But the data also demonstrate that declaratory judgment
actions are 2.4 times more likely to be transferred than nondeclaratory judg-
ment cases. This suggests that declaratory judgment plaintiffs are often unable
to hold onto their chosen forum.  Indiscriminate use of declaratory judgment
actions to forum shop thus increases unpredictability and wasteful litigation,
thereby impeding innovation.  The new data presented herein regarding forum
shopping by patent litigants give a richer context to the debate over forum
shopping in general and serves as a basis for further investigation into its ef-
fects on judicial norms and efficiency.
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INTRODUCTION
Forum matters in patent litigation.  Patentee win rates, the likeli-
hood of getting to trial, and time to case resolution all vary depending
on the judicial district in which the case is heard.1  Scholars have noted
1 See Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 411–15
(2010) (finding that patentee win rates varied from 55.1% in the Northern District of Texas to
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that the permissive venue statute governing patent cases allows patent
owners to bring their suits “in virtually any district in the country.”2  It
is no wonder that forum shopping is widespread.3
The choice of forum, however, is not exclusively in the hands of
the patent owner.  Accused patent infringers can, under certain cir-
cumstances, preemptively file an action in their favored forum asking
the court for a declaratory judgment that the patent is not infringed or
invalid.4  Indeed, many declaratory judgment actions are filed by ac-
cused infringers5 to control the forum and timing of suit because they
can secure a significant advantage when the cases go to trial.6
Moreover, if the forum that is initially selected by the plaintiff7 is
truly inconvenient for the defendant, the defendant can move for a
11.5% in the Northern District of Georgia; that more cases make it to trial in the District of
Delaware, the Eastern District of Texas, the Western District of Wisconsin, and the Eastern
District of Virginia; and that the time to case resolution for the average case varies from six
months in the Western District of Wisconsin, to about sixteen months in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania).
2 Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect
Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 892 (2001); see Paul M. Janicke, Patent Venue and Conve-
nience Transfer: New World or Small Shift?, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE EDITION 1, 6–8
(2009), http://www.ncjolt.org/sites/default/files/Janicke.pdf (noting that, for purposes of deter-
mining proper venue, a corporate defendant’s “residence” is “broadly defined as any district
where it would have minimum contacts sufficient to support personal jurisdiction”).  For a more
detailed discussion of the patent venue statute, see infra Part II.
3 See Kevin A. Meehan, Shopping for Expedient, Inexpensive & Predictable Patent Litiga-
tion, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F., no. 102,901, 2008, at 2, http://bciptf.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/07/14-iptf-meehan.pdf (“There is no question that patent plaintiffs are forum shop-
ping.”); Moore, supra note 2, at 892 (“Providing plaintiffs with so many potential venues for
bringing suit increases the ability of parties to forum shop.”); see also Jeanne C. Fromer,
Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1462–63 (2010) (discussing “[w]idespread [f]orum
[s]hopping in the [d]istrict [c]ourts”).
4 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006) (amended 2010) (“In a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations
of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be
sought.”); see Lemley, supra note 1, at 402 (“[A]ccused infringers play much the same game,
looking for defense-favorable jurisdictions in which to file declaratory judgment actions.”);
Moore, supra note 2, at 897 (noting that declaratory judgment actions “level the playing field”
for defendants).  For more discussion on jurisdictional requirements to file for declaratory relief,
see infra Part II.
5 Fromer, supra note 3, at 1464 (noting that in 2005, 15.49% of patent suits filed outside of
the Eastern District of Texas were declaratory judgment suits); Moore, supra note 2, at 921
(noting that from 1983 to 1999, 14% of all tried cases ending in a decision by the factfinder were
declaratory judgment suits).
6 See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—an Empirical Peek Inside the
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 368 (2000) (finding that plaintiff patentees won 68% of jury
trials, whereas defendant patentees won only 38% of jury trials in declaratory judgment actions).
7 In the typical patent infringement case, the plaintiff is the patent owner. See Fromer,
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change of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).8  This allows the court to
decide where the case can most conveniently be tried.9  Given the im-
pact that the forum has on the ultimate outcome of the case, these
motions are frequently filed and hotly contested.10  As a result, patent
litigants spend a considerable amount of time and money choosing,
and fighting over, forum.11
The effect of forum shopping on judicial uniformity and efficiency
has been extensively debated in the academic literature.12  But al-
though previous studies have looked at issues of forum shopping in
patent cases generally,13 no study has focused on forum shopping by
accused patent infringers.  This omission is problematic given the im-
portance of forum selection in patent litigation.14
supra note 3, at 1453.  In a declaratory judgment case, the plaintiff is the accused infringer. See
id. at 1454.
8 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the inter-
est of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought.”); see David E. Steinberg, The Motion to Transfer and the Interests
of Justice, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 443, 445 (1990) (“[W]here the plaintiff has chosen a district
arbitrarily or to harass a defendant, the defendant may seek a transfer to a more convenient
federal district.”).  For further discussion of § 1404(a), see infra Part I.D.
Although § 1404(a) is “easily the most important of the various federal statutes and rules
providing for transfer of a case within the federal system,” there are others.  15 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3842 (3d ed. 2011).  If suit is filed in an improper venue, the district court may transfer the case
to a court of proper venue under § 1406(a). Id.  Under § 1407, multiple cases pending in differ-
ent districts involving common questions of fact can be transferred to one court for coordinated
or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Id.
9 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 8, § 3841 (“Section 1404(a) allows the dis-
trict court to make a particularized determination, under all of the circumstances of an individual
case, on where it can most, or at least more, conveniently be tried.”).
10 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80
CORNELL L. REV 1507, 1509 (1995) (“Once in litigation, the parties frequently dispute venue.
Litigators deal with nearly as many change-of-venue motions as trials.”).
11 See Fromer, supra note 3, at 1462 (noting that forum shopping in patent cases is “wide-
spread”); Lemley, supra note 1, at 402 (“[P]atent litigants spend a great deal of time and effort
worrying about where to file their case.”); see also Steinberg, supra note 8, at 446 (noting a
“deluge of motions to transfer litigated in the lower federal courts”).
12 See generally Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1507 (arguing that transfer coun-
ters the detriments of forum shopping); Moore, supra note 2, at 892–93 (describing the norma-
tive evils and economic inefficiency of forum shopping); Steinberg, supra note 8, at 447 (arguing
that transfer motions are “vehicles for defendant delay” and an increasing burden on courts).
13 See, e.g., Scott E. Atkinson et al., The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity,
Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411, 411–13 (2009) (summarizing the
outcome of an econometric study on forum shopping); Fromer, supra note 3, at 1445 (discussing
widespread forum shopping); Moore, supra note 2, at 901–20 (empirically analyzing patent en-
forcement in the district courts); Janicke, supra note 2, at 25–26 (studying transfer rates for
patent cases in the Eastern District of Texas).
14 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 2, at 892 (“[C]hoice of forum continues to play a critical role
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Using a novel dataset derived from the Stanford Intellectual
Property Litigation Clearinghouse15 and drawing on related empirical
research, this Article seeks to answer the following questions: (1) are
declaratory judgments being used by accused infringers to forum
shop?; and if so, (2) how successful is declaratory judgment as a forum
shopping tool?
The empirical results presented in this Article demonstrate that
accused infringers actively use declaratory judgment actions to forum
shop.  But accused infringers are relying on a forum shopping tool that
is not reliable.  The data indicate that declaratory judgment cases are
2.4 times more likely to be transferred than nondeclaratory judgment
cases, suggesting that accused infringers are often unable to hold on to
their chosen forum.16  This new information about forum shopping by
patent litigants provides a richer context for the debate over forum
shopping in general and serves as a basis for further investigation into
the effects of forum shopping on judicial norms and efficiency.
This Article also uses this data to question long-held assumptions
regarding the use of declaratory judgment and argues for a reevalua-
tion of current patent litigation practices.  Although this Article fo-
cuses on patent law, its conclusions have implications for attorneys
practicing in other fields as well.  There may be other well-accepted
litigation practices that are not worth their expense.  To better inform
the practice of law in general, other litigation practices should be em-
pirically tested for cost effectiveness.  Only with this data in hand can
lawyers properly educate their clients on the true risks and costs of
litigation.
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I provides a primer on
patent litigation and forum shopping, and explains why accused in-
fringers rely on declaratory judgment actions to forum shop.  Part II
outlines the design and methodology of the Study presented in this
Article.  Part III presents the results of the Study and reports that
accused infringers are actively forum shopping via declaratory judg-
ment.  Part IV discusses the implications of these results and suggests
avenues for future research.  The Appendices to this Article present
in the outcome of patent litigation.”); Richard C. Wydick, Venue in Actions for Patent Infringe-
ment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 551, 551 (1973) (“All too often, patent infringement suits begin with a
battle over where the war is to be fought.”); see also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S.
22, 39 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Venue is often a vitally important matter, as is shown by
the frequency with which parties contractually provide for and litigate the issue.”).
15 See infra Part II.
16 See infra Part III.B.
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more details on the methodology used to create the datasets and ana-
lyze the data using additional metrics.
I. PATENT LITIGATION, FORUM SHOPPING, AND
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
The fundamental goal of the American patent system is to en-
courage innovation by “rewarding inventors with a time-limited exclu-
sive patent right.”17  In order to obtain a patent, the applicant must
prepare a patent application and submit it to the United States Patent
and Trademark Office.18  Once received by the Patent Office, the ap-
plication is reviewed by a patent examiner to determine if it complies
with the statutory requirements of patentability: patentable subject
matter,19 utility,20 novelty,21 nonobviousness,22 and adequate disclo-
sure.23  Once the patent issues, it grants the patentee the right to ex-
clude anyone else from practicing that invention.24  In order to enforce
these rights, the patentee can file suit in federal district court if an-
other person “without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention, within the United States.”25  Appeals from such
suits are heard by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which
has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases.26
A. The High Cost of Patent Litigation
Patent litigation is exploding.27  The probability that a patent will
be involved in one or more lawsuits within four years of its issue date
17 Fromer, supra note 3, at 1450.
18 JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 42 (3d ed. 2009).
19 Patentable subject matter is “any . . . process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any . . . improvement thereof.”  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
20 Patents are granted only for useful inventions. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.
21 Patents are granted only for inventions that are new.  35 U.S.C. § 102.
22 Patents are granted only for inventions that are not obvious improvements on existing
knowledge. Id. § 103.
23 Patents must distinctly claim the invention as well as disclose a written description of
the invention, the manner and process of making and using the invention (so as to satisfy the
enablement requirement), and the best mode of carrying out the invention. Id. § 112.
24 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011); CRAIG ALLEN NARD,
THE LAW OF PATENTS 387 (1st ed. 2008) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)).
25 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006) (granting federal district courts
exclusive and original jurisdiction over patent disputes); NARD, supra note 24, at 389.
26 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1); see NARD, supra note 24, at 389.
27 See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAU-
CRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 127, 128 fig.6.2 (2008) (showing that from 1990
to 2006, patent litigation “exhibit[ed] an unparalleled steady and rapid increase”).
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doubled from 1988 to 2000.28  This increase has occurred despite the
fact that patent litigation is extremely expensive; legal fees for taking
a patent case to trial can easily reach $2.5 million.29  Viewed in aggre-
gate, patent litigation costs are now so high that they can significantly
exceed patent profits.30  This means that, for most industries, patents
divert valuable resources away from research and development,
thereby constituting “a brake on innovation.”31
There are many reasons for the high cost of patent litigation.  Pat-
ents are often issued with vague terms that cover overly abstract con-
cepts, making it very difficult to determine the boundaries of the
patentee’s rights.32  Judicial interpretation of patent claims in litigation
is also extremely unpredictable.33  This makes it challenging to ascer-
tain a patent’s scope ex ante, short of litigating it to a nonappealable
decision.34  Finally, the loser faces high damages awards35 and crip-
28 Id. at 129 fig.6.3.
29 AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 29 (2009) (noting that, for patent cases for
which there is between $1 million and $25 million at risk, the median litigation cost is $1.5 mil-
lion to take the case to the end of discovery and $2.5 million to take the case to the end of trial).
Indeed, given the astronomical price of entry, patent litigation is often referred to as the “sport
of kings.” See Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence
in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1584 (2009).
30 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 27, at 139 fig.6.5; id. at 140 (noting that except for the
chemical and pharmaceutical industries, litigation costs “clearly exceeded the profits from pat-
ents” in the late 1990s).
31 Id. at 145.
32 See Chester S. Chuang, Unjust Patents & Bargaining Breakdown: When Is Declaratory
Relief Needed?, 64 SMU L. REV. 895, 908–10 (2011) (discussing vague and ambiguous patents).
33 The process of determining the meaning and scope of a patent claim in litigation is
called claim construction. AMY L. LANDERS, UNDERSTANDING PATENT LAW 257 (2008).  The
rules governing claim construction are in flux, and their implementation by individual judges is
highly variable. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 27, at 58–61 (noting that the Federal Circuit
has not formulated a predictable method of claim interpretation); Dan L. Burk & Mark A.
Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1743, 1745 (2009) (“Claim construction is sufficiently uncertain that many parties don’t settle a
case until after the court has construed the claims, because there is no baseline for agreement on
what the patent might possibly cover.”); Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s
Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14 (2009) (“On multiple levels, courts struggle to
assess the meaning of claim terms and the consequent scope of the right to exclude.  The con-
struction of the literal meaning of a claim is rife with uncertainty.”); see also Enzo Biochem, Inc.
v. Applera Corp., 605 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Plager, J., dissenting) (“The court now
spends a substantial amount of judicial resources trying to make sense of unclear, overbroad,
and sometimes incoherent claim terms.”). But see Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Ap-
peal, and the Predictability of Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1037–39 (2007)
(questioning whether district courts are reversed more frequently on claim construction than on
other issues).
34 DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 28 (2009) (“The only way to find out whether a patent covers what you are doing is to
go to . . . the appeals court.”).
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pling injunctions,36 so the stakes of patent litigation are extremely
high.  With so much at risk, it is no wonder that parties seek out every
possible litigation advantage—in particular, spending “a great deal of
time and effort worrying about where to file their case.”37
B. Forum Shopping and Patent Litigation
Forum shopping in patent litigation is facilitated by permissive
venue rules.  Because the federal district courts have exclusive and
original jurisdiction over patent cases,38 determining which district can
hear a particular case turns on personal jurisdiction and venue.39  The
patent venue statute states: “Any civil action for patent infringement
may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or
where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a
regular and established place of business.”40  When the defendant is a
corporate entity, venue and personal jurisdiction merge into the same
inquiry because a corporation resides “in any judicial district in which
it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is
commenced.”41
Personal jurisdiction requires only that the defendant have pur-
poseful minimum contacts with the district in which the case is
35 The patent laws require courts to award, upon a finding of patent infringement, “dam-
ages adequate to compensate for the infringement.”  35 U.S.C. § 284, para. 1 (2006).  For a re-
cent example, consider the patent infringement suit brought against Microsoft Corporation by a
small software company named i4i Limited. See i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831,
839–40 (Fed. Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).  The patentee alleged that the custom XML
editor feature in Microsoft Word infringed its patent, and, using a royalty rate that valued this
feature at more than the price of some versions of Microsoft Word, was awarded $240 million in
damages. Id. at 839, 852–54.
36 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 34, at 23, 29 (describing how injunctions can cripple busi-
nesses).  In i4i Ltd., Microsoft was also permanently enjoined from selling Microsoft Word with
the infringing feature. i4i Ltd., 598 F.3d at 861–64.
37 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 402 (describing how both patentees and accused infringers
forum shop).
38 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006) (giving federal district courts exclusive and original jurisdic-
tion over patent disputes).
39 Elizabeth P. Offen-Brown, Note, Forum Shopping and Venue Transfer in Patent Cases:
Marshall’s Response to TS Tech and Genentech, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61, 64–65 (2010).
40 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).  For a review of the history of the patent venue statute, see Fromer,
supra note 3, at 1452–54.
41 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), amended by Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification
Act of 2011, Pub. L. No 112-63, § 202, 125 Stat. 758, 763–64.  As a note, “personal jurisdiction
and venue requirements for a declaratory judgment plaintiff are governed by the general venue
statute.”  Moore, supra note 2, at 898.  “[T]he patent venue statute and the general venue statute
are interpreted identically for corporations and turn on whether there is personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.” Id. at 899.
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brought.42  This requirement usually is met if the defendant sells, of-
fers to sell, or licenses others to sell products to residents of the forum;
thus any company that operates nationwide is likely subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction in most judicial districts.43  Because corporate de-
fendants operating nationwide are the most common type of
defendants in patent litigation, personal jurisdiction, and therefore
venue, is easily satisfied in nearly all judicial districts.44  This gives pat-
ent plaintiffs “an unfettered choice of where to bring suit.”45
The ease with which personal jurisdiction and venue require-
ments are met in most patent cases has led to rampant forum shop-
ping.46  There are many reasons that a party may prefer one judicial
district over another: the knowledge and experience of the judges,
characteristics and biases of potential jurors, the attorney’s familiarity
with the judges of the district and the court’s local rules, and conve-
nience to the parties, witnesses, and counsel.47  But the most impor-
tant reason to forum shop is that the outcome of the case often turns
on the choice of forum.48  In a study of 21,667 district court patent
cases, Professor Mark Lemley found that the jurisdiction in which a
case is litigated has a significant impact on its outcome, ranging from a
win rate of 45.3% in the District of Delaware to only 21% in the Dis-
42 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474–75 (1985).
43 Moore, supra note 2, at 895 (“[A]ny company that operates in national commerce is
likely subject to personal jurisdiction in many possible districts.”).
44 Fromer, supra note 3, at 1455 (“Because of the broad geographic scope of most defend-
ants’ businesses, those rules give rise to venue in many of the ninety-four federal judicial dis-
tricts.”); Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric
Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 193, 197 (2007) (“[M]ost large national corporations may now be sued for patent infringe-
ment in virtually any of the ninety-four federal districts.”); Offen-Brown, supra note 39, at 65
(“[M]ost large national corporations can be brought into patent infringement actions in almost
any of the ninety-four different federal district courts . . . .”); Janicke, supra note 2, at 6 (“Given
the operational scope of most large business entities today, the current corporate venue statute is
often easy to satisfy in nearly every district.”).
45 Moore, supra note 2, at 901.
46 Fromer, supra note 3, at 1463 (“[P]atent litigants have continued to forum shop . . .
because plaintiffs still care very much about which district court hears their case.”); Lemley,
supra note 1, at 402 (“Forum shopping is alive and well in patent law . . . [and] shows no signs of
disappearing.”); Meehan, supra note 3, at 2 (“There is no question that patent plaintiffs are
forum shopping.”). But see Atkinson et al., supra note 13, at 441 (“[T]here was significant
nonuniformity in validity outcomes across U.S. geographical circuits in the pre-[Federal Circuit]
era and significant forum shopping.  In the [Federal Circuit] era, systematic nonuniformity across
circuits remains, but it is much smaller in magnitude.  Forum shopping on the basis of validity
rates appears to have been mitigated.”).
47 Moore, supra note 2, at 899–900.
48 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1508 (“Venue is worth fighting over because
outcome often turns on forum.”).
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trict of New Jersey.49  Significant interdistrict variation was also found
with respect to such measures as likelihood of getting to trial and time
to resolution.50  Indeed, by combining various measures into an aggre-
gate ranking, Lemley asserts that the best patent district for plaintiffs
is the Middle District of Florida, and that the best district for accused
infringers is the Eastern District of Wisconsin.51  In light of these
starkly disparate outcomes, parties that do not forum shop proceed at
their own risk.
C. Declaratory Judgment Actions: Forum Shopping
by Accused Infringers
Patentees are not the only parties that forum shop.  Accused in-
fringers can also forum shop by filing an action for declaratory relief
under the Declaratory Judgment Act.52
The Declaratory Judgment Act gives parties who are uncertain of
their legal rights a way to preemptively seek judicial determination of
their rights.53  Declaratory judgments therefore allow parties “to avoid
accrual of avoidable damages,” to adjudicate disputes early without
waiting for the adversary to bring suit, and “to clarify legal relation-
ships before they have been disturbed or a party’s rights have been
violated.”54  Although declaratory relief is not limited to patent dis-
putes, it is particularly important to potential patent infringers be-
cause it allows them to preemptively challenge the validity of a patent
and to affirm that they are not infringing, thus avoiding substantial
future damages.55
49 Lemley, supra note 1, at 407–09.
50 See id. at 411–15.
51 See id. at 419–21.
52 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006) (amended 2010); see Lemley, supra note 1 at 402 (stating that
accused infringers also forum shop by “looking for defense-favorable jurisdictions in which to
file declaratory judgment actions”); see also James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for
Patent Policy from Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 25–26
(2005) (“[T]he patent holder might fear an alleged infringer will gain a forum selection advan-
tage by filing a declaratory judgment suit.”). But see Atkinson et al., supra note 13, at 425 (not-
ing that forum shopping by alleged infringers based on validity rates “was less valuable and thus
less likely” from 1953 to 2002).
53 See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (“In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any
court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.”).
54 Homer Yang-hsien Hsu, Note, Neutralizing Actual Controversy: How Patent Holders
Can Reduce the Risk of Declaratory Judgment in Patent Disputes, 6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS
93, 9596 (2010).
55 As stated by one of the Declaratory Judgment Act’s supporters during Senate hearings:
I assert that I have a right to use a certain patent.  You claim that you have a
patent.  What am I going to do about it?  There is no way that I can litigate my
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A party that merely “learns of the existence of an adversely held
patent” or “[s]imply disagree[s] with the existence of a patent,” how-
ever, cannot seek declaratory relief.56  In order for a court to have
subject matter jurisdiction over a declaratory relief action, the plaintiff
must establish the existence of “a case of actual controversy.”57  Prior
to 2007, the Federal Circuit applied a two-prong test to determine
whether an actual controversy existed in suits involving patent in-
fringement.58  A declaratory judgment plaintiff was required to
(1) demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of being sued by the pat-
entee, and (2) present activity that could constitute infringement or
meaningful preparation to conduct potentially infringing activity.59
In 2007, the Supreme Court relaxed these requirements in
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.60 and instructed courts to con-
sider “whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show
right, which I claim, to use that device, except by going ahead and using it, and you
[the patent holder] can sit back as long as you please and let me run up just as high
a bill of damages as you wish to have me run up, and then you may sue me for the
damages, and I am ruined, having acted all the time in good faith and on my best
judgment, but having no way in the world to find out whether I had a right to use
that device or not.
Declaratory Judgments: Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 70th Cong. 35 (1928) (statement of E.R. Sunderland); see also Arrowhead Indus. Water,
Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[A] patent owner attempts extra-
judicial patent enforcement with scare-the-customer-and-run tactics that infect the competitive
environment of the business community with uncertainty and insecurity.  Before the Act, com-
petitors victimized by that tactic were rendered helpless and immobile so long as the patent
owner refused to grasp the nettle and sue.  After the Act, those competitors were no longer
restricted to an in terrorem choice between the incurrence of a growing potential liability for
patent infringement and abandonment of their enterprises; they could clear the air by suing for a
judgment that would settle the conflict of interests.” (citation omitted)), abrogated on other
grounds by Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
Chuang, supra note 32, at 900 (noting the importance of declaratory relief to potential infringers
because of substantial damages awards); Tejas N. Narechania, Note, An Offensive Weapon?: An
Empirical Analysis of the “Sword” of State Sovereign Immunity in State-Owned Patents, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1574, 1590–91 (2010) (noting that declaratory judgment actions serve an impor-
tant role in the intellectual property system); Marta R. Vanegas, Note, You Infringed My Patent,
Now Wait Until I Sue You: The Federal Circuit’s Decision in Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten
International Co., 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 384 (2010) (noting that Congress
was “especially mindful of the problems presented in patent, trademark, and copyright infringe-
ment cases” when it enacted the Declaratory Judgment Act).
56 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Myriad), 653 F.3d
1329, 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
57 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
58 See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736 (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers,
Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 955 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
59 Id.
60 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
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that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse
legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issu-
ance of a declaratory judgment.”61  Following MedImmune, a poten-
tial patent infringer seeking declaratory judgment “must allege both
(1) an affirmative act by the patentee related to the enforcement of
his patent rights, and (2) meaningful preparation to conduct poten-
tially infringing activity.”62  A case of actual controversy thus arises
“where a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain iden-
tified ongoing or planned activity of another party, and where that
party contends that it has the right to engage in the accused activity
without license.”63  For a potential patent infringer in this situation,
declaratory judgment actions are considered to be a particularly effec-
tive way to challenge a patent because the accused infringer can
choose the forum of the suit and control its timing, thereby gaining a
significant advantage at trial.64
These perceived advantages can be so great that they induce po-
tential infringers to file declaratory judgment actions to challenge pat-
ents that are already the subject of an extant infringement suit filed by
the patentee.  Such second-filed declaratory judgment actions com-
monly result when the potential infringer loses the race to the court-
house,65 or when the potential infringer is not named in the patentee’s
suit.66  For example, the patentee may sue only the customers of a
product manufactured by the potential infringer,67 the distributor of a
61 Id. at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted).
62 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Myriad), 653 F.3d
1329, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
63 Id. at 1344 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64 See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18
GEO. MASON L. REV. 43, 56–57 (2010) (stating that the advantages of pursuing declaratory relief
in patent cases are that the accused infringer can choose the forum and control the timing of
suit); Moore, supra note 6, at 368; see also R. Scott Weide, Patent Enforcement Deterrence: Lib-
eral Assertions of Personal Jurisdiction in Declaratory Judgment Actions, 65 UMKC L. REV. 177,
177 (1996) (“In many instances, the filing of a declaratory judgment action gives the alleged
infringer a significant strategic advantage over the patent owner.”); Hsu, supra note 54, at 96
(“The advantages of declaratory judgments for alleged patent infringers are many.”).
As a note, “personal jurisdiction and venue requirements for a declaratory judgment plain-
tiff are governed by the general venue statute.”  Moore, supra note 2, at 898.  “[T]he patent
venue statute and the general venue statute are interpreted identically for corporations and turn
on whether there is personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id at 899.
65 See, e.g., Motorola Inc. v. Research In Motion Ltd., No. 08-CV-104-SLR, 2008 WL
3925278, at *2 (D. Del. transferred Aug. 26, 2008); Research In Motion Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., 644
F. Supp. 2d 788, 791–92 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
66 See, e.g., Delphi Corp. v. Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc., No. 08-CV-11048, 2008 WL 2941116, at
*1 (E.D. Mich. July 25, 2008).
67 See, e.g., id.
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product manufactured by the potential infringer,68 or the patentee
may name a corporate entity that is related to, but separate from, the
potential infringer.69  In these situations, the potential infringer—the
party actually responsible for manufacturing the allegedly infringing
product—often files a declaratory judgment action against the paten-
tee in the potential infringer’s favored forum.70
Because many believe that bringing a declaratory judgment ac-
tion gives important advantages to accused infringers, such actions are
considered to be the primary way that accused infringers can “level[ ]
the playing field.”71  It should be no surprise that accused infringers
file significant numbers of declaratory judgment suits each year.72
D. Transfer Motions: Additional Forum Shopping Tools
Once the initial forum selection is made, either by the patent
owner or by the accused infringer via declaratory judgment, the forum
fight is not over.  The defendant has the opportunity to bring a trans-
fer motion to request a change of venue to a more convenient forum
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).73  If such a motion is brought, the district
court has substantial discretion to decide whether a transfer is
warranted.74
Although the relevant factors differ by circuit, most courts divide
the factors they consider into private and public categories.75  “Private
factors include the statutory considerations of convenience of the par-
ties and witnesses, but also often include the plaintiff’s forum prefer-
ence, where the claim arose, and the relative ease of access to sources
68 See, e.g., Alke B.V. v. L.B. White Co., No. 3:08-CV88-C, 2008 WL 2447357, at *1–2
(W.D.N.C. June 13, 2008).
69 See, e.g., Complaint, Chase Bank USA N.A. v. Source Inc., No. 1:08-CV-00918-SD (D.
Del. filed Dec. 8, 2008).
70 Antony L. Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 186 (2000)
(describing this kind of action as a “common patent-law fact pattern”).  The data showed that
23.3% of declaratory judgment actions subject to transfer were filed by potential infringer-plain-
tiffs that were not named in the patentee’s suit. See infra Part III.C.1–2.
71 Moore, supra note 2, at 897.
72 See infra Part III; see also Fromer, supra note 3, at 1464; Moore, supra note 2, at 921.
73 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).  Cases can also be transferred under other transfer statutes,
such as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1406–1407.  15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 8, § 3842.  Such
transfers are much less common than transfers under § 1404(a), id., so this Part focuses on ex-
plaining the procedures for transfer under § 1404(a).
74 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 8, § 3847 (describing substantial discretion
courts have to consider a wide variety of factors); Moore, supra note 2, at 898 (“[T]ransfer is a
complicated inquiry very much at the discretion of the district court.”).
75 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 8, § 3847.
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of proof.”76  “Public factors, which encompass the statutory considera-
tion of the interest of justice, focus on judicial economy and often in-
clude the district court’s familiarity with the governing law, the local
interest in deciding local controversies at home, and the relative con-
gestion of the courts.”77  The plaintiff’s initial choice of forum is usu-
ally given deference,78 but courts have cautioned against giving it
“inordinate” weight.79  Despite this caveat, the general perception is
that transfer motions are infrequently granted because of the defer-
ence given to the plaintiff’s choice of forum.80
In light of the multiple factors to consider, and the expansive dis-
cretion given to the district court, it is difficult to predict the outcome
of an individual transfer motion.81  By looking at an aggregate number
of transfer motions, however, we can obtain valuable information
about parties’ forum shopping activities.  High transfer rates out of
any particular forum reflect a judge’s determination that many of the
cases filed in the forum have only limited ties to the forum and are
evidence of forum shopping activity.82  Although other scholars have
documented transfer rates among federal cases in general83 and com-
76 Id.; see, e.g., In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[P]rivate
interest factors include (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing
witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make a trial easy, expeditious and inexpen-
sive.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
77 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 8, § 3847; see, e.g., Genentech, 566 F.3d at
1342 (“[P]ublic interest factors include (1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court con-
gestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of
the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems
of conflicts of laws [or in] the application of foreign law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
78 See Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The
general rule favors the forum of the first-filed action, whether or not it is a declaratory judgment
action.”).
79 In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Micron Tech.,
518 F.3d at 904 (stating that courts should not give too much deference to the first-filed action,
but should consider the convenience factors under § 1404(a)).  As stated by the Federal Circuit,
for example: “[P]recedent clearly forbids treating the plaintiff’s choice of venue as a distinct
factor in the § 1404(a) analysis . . .  [because] the plaintiff’s choice of venue corresponds to the
burden that a moving party must meet in order to demonstrate that the transferee venue is a
clearly more convenient venue.” TS Tech USA, 551 F.3d at 1320.
80 Moore, supra note 2, at 897 (“Transfer motions . . . are not frequently granted, in part
because courts give substantial deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum in determining
whether to transfer.”).
81 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 8, § 3847 (noting that it is difficult to state
the circumstances that will require grant or denial of a transfer motion).
82 Moore, supra note 2, at 915–16.
83 See generally Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1513 (comparing plaintiffs’ win
rates in transferred and nontransferred cases).
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pared transfer rates for patent cases in the Eastern District of Texas84
with other popular patent districts,85 no study has focused on forum
shopping by accused infringers via declaratory judgment actions.  Be-
cause declaratory judgment actions are the primary means by which
accused infringers forum shop,86 this is an omission that needs to be
addressed.  Accordingly, this Article presents new data on declaratory
judgment suits filed by accused patent infringers and uses the data to
examine the extent to which accused infringers forum shop and their
corresponding success rates.
II. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
This Study relies on data collected by the Stanford Intellectual
Property Litigation Clearinghouse (“IPLC”).87  The IPLC collects
data on every patent lawsuit filed in the United States since 200088 by
relying on a dataset derived from Public Access to Court Electronic
Records (“PACER”), an electronic service that allows users to obtain
case and docket information from federal courts.89  The IPLC allows
users to search through its database using various criteria such as case
type, filing date, party name, and case event.90
For this Study, data were gathered for all patent infringement
suits filed in 2008 by using the IPLC’s predefined search criteria.  The
year 2008 was selected for two reasons.  First, as discussed above, the
Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in MedImmune created a “more leni-
ent legal standard” that enhanced the availability of declaratory judg-
84 A large number of patent cases are filed in the Eastern District of Texas. See Megan
Woodhouse, Note, Shop ‘til You Drop: Implementing Federal Rules of Patent Litigation Proce-
dure to Wear Out Forum Shopping Patent Plaintiffs, 99 GEO. L.J. 227, 228 (2010).  The Eastern
District of Texas has been described as a potential “national leader in patent litigation.”
Leychkis, supra note 44, at 195.  For additional discussion, see infra Part III.B.4.
85 See Mark Liang, The Aftermath of TS Tech: The End of Forum Shopping in Patent
Litigation and Implications for Non-Practicing Entities, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 29, 39–43
(2010). See generally Janicke, supra note 2, at 1–2.
86 See Moore, supra note 2, at 920 (“There is a perception that the infringer will achieve an
advantage by filing a declaratory judgment action against the patentee, rather than waiting for
the patentee to file an infringement suit.”).
87 The IPLC is available without charge for academic, government, and nonprofit users,
and by subscription for commercial users. See The Genesis of Lex Machina, LEX MACHINA,
https://lexmachina.com/about/genesis (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
88 Lemley, supra note 1, at 404.
89 Mark A. Lemley & J. H. Walker, Intellectual Property Litigation Clearinghouse: Data
Overview (Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper No. 1,024,032), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1024032; see Chien, supra note 29, at 1593.
90 See The Genesis of Lex Machina, supra note 87.
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ment jurisdiction in patent cases.91  Accordingly, a dataset consisting
of post-Medimmune cases would more accurately reflect current prac-
tices surrounding the use of declaratory judgment in patent cases.
Second, considerable time can pass before a transfer motion is re-
solved.92  Thus, to ensure that every case would have the opportunity
to progress to the point where a transfer motion would have been
filed and resolved, the dataset did not include the years after 2008.
Each case in the resulting dataset was then checked individually
to further split the full dataset into two distinct subsets: cases initiated
by the accused infringer via declaratory judgment, and cases initiated
by the patentee.  By running various searches on these datasets, those
cases that were subject to transfer motions were identified and sepa-
rated.93  Additional data, such as type of party bringing the transfer
motion and whether the transfer motion was granted, denied, or un-
resolved were also collected.94
The resulting customized dataset provides a more accurate basis
for measuring forum shopping activity by accused patent infringers via
declaratory judgment than other available datasets.  For example, on-
line databases such as LexisNexis or Westlaw are incomplete because
searches on those databases only return published cases.95  Relying
solely on published cases significantly undercounts the number of
both declaratory judgments and transfer motions filed in patent
cases.96  Likewise, the Federal Court Cases Integrated Database,
which reports data for each civil case terminated in a given fiscal year,
including transfers, is incomplete.97  Although this database includes
unpublished cases, it does not indicate whether the plaintiff opposed
the transfer, or even instigated it, and does not reflect how many
91 Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 902 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also
Chuang, supra note 32, at 900–02 (discussing Medimmune and its aftermath).
92 Section 1404(a) sets no limit on the time by which a motion to transfer must be made.
15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 8, § 3844.  Some cases in this dataset that were filed
in 2008 were not transferred until 2010. See, e.g., Motiva LLC v. Nintendo Co., No. 6:08-cv-
00429-LED (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2010) (case filed on Nov. 10, 2008, and transferred to the Western
District of Washington on March 1, 2010).
93 For a detailed explanation of the selection and coding of the dataset, see Appendix A.
94 For a detailed explanation of the types of data collected, see Appendix A.
95 Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
481, 508 n.132 (2011) (noting that Westlaw and LexisNexis “only include decisions that are pub-
lished in official reporters or otherwise made available by judges for electronic publication”).
96 See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 107 n.335
(2002) (noting that many judicial decisions are unpublished).
97 Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 1970–2000, INTER-U. CONSORTIUM FOR POL.
& SOC. RES., http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/08429 (last visited Mar. 6,
2012); see Janicke, supra note 2, at 14–15 (describing database).
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transfers were sought during the years in question, only how many
were granted.98  Thus, the Federal Court Cases Integrated Database
cannot be used to determine the likelihood that a given transfer mo-
tion will be granted.  The IPLC database, although it allows research-
ers to determine the number of transfer motions granted and denied
by using key word searches,99 requires an extensive amount of addi-
tional manual coding to obtain an accurate count of declaratory judg-
ment filings.100  Accordingly, the instant dataset provides a more
accurate way to gauge forum shopping activity by accused patent in-
fringers via declaratory judgment.101
III. RESULTS
Using this dataset, this Article seeks to answer the following
questions: (1) is declaratory judgment used by accused infringers to
forum shop?; and if so, (2) how successful is declaratory judgment as a
forum shopping tool?  In light of the preceding discussion, one would
expect that declaratory judgment actions are often used to forum shop
because of the known importance of forum in patent litigation and
because of the known advantages that filing such an action provides
an accused infringer.  One would also expect that a declaratory judg-
ment action is a good strategy for an accused infringer to secure its
desired forum, given that courts should afford deference to the declar-
atory judgment plaintiff’s choice of forum.
The evidence does support the proposition that declaratory judg-
ment actions are often used to forum shop, but, unexpectedly, the evi-
dence also indicates that declaratory judgment actions are unreliable
forum shopping tools when challenged.
As a preliminary matter, this Study found that 335 patent cases
were initiated as declaratory judgment actions in 2008, out of a total of
2412 total patent infringement cases filed that year.  Thus, declaratory
judgment actions constituted 13.9% of all patent infringement suits
filed in 2008, which correlates well with findings by other scholars.102
98 Janicke, supra note 2, at 15 (describing database limitations).
99 Id. at 19 (describing the ability to determine, from the IPLC, the proportion of transfer
motions granted or denied).
100 A keyword search for “declaratory judgment” among patent cases filed in 2008 returns
516 cases, whereas a manual check confirmed only 335 declaratory judgment patent complaints
filed that year. LEX MACHINA, http://lexmachina.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2011) (search results
on file with author).
101 Of course, there are limitations to the dataset, which are discussed infra Part IV.A.
102 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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A. Are Declaratory Judgment Actions Used to Forum Shop?
To determine how often declaratory judgment actions were used
by accused infringers to forum shop in patent cases, the number of
transfer motions filed in declaratory judgment (“DJ”) patent cases
was compared with the number filed in nondeclaratory judgment
(“NDJ”) patent cases.  High numbers of transfer motions suggest that
plaintiffs are actively forum shopping, because defendants would not
invest the time and resources required to file a motion to transfer un-
less the forum selected by a plaintiff was “too favorable to tolerate.”103
Table 1 reports the total number of cases in the dataset (n = 2412)
and segregates that data by whether the case was a DJ case and
whether a motion to transfer was filed in the case.
TABLE 1. CASE TYPE BY TRANSFER MOTION FILED
Cases in Which a Cases in Which Percent of Cases
Transfer Motion No Transfer Total Number Where Transfer
Case Type Was Filed Motion Was Filed of Cases Motion Was Filed
DJ 86 249 335 25.7%
NDJ 275 1802 2077 13.2%
Total 361 2051 2412
The data show that motions to transfer are filed more often in DJ
cases (25.7%) than in NDJ cases (13.2%).  This difference is statisti-
cally significant, and the null hypothesis that filing a transfer motion is
not associated with filing for declaratory relief can be rejected.104  The
high prevalence of transfer motions in DJ cases as compared to NDJ
cases suggests that declaratory judgment actions are often used by ac-
cused infringers to forum shop.  Moreover, because motions to trans-
fer are granted infrequently,105 the high prevalence of motions to
transfer in DJ cases suggests that declaratory judgment suits are often
used by accused infringers to select particularly favorable fora suffi-
ciently disadvantageous to the defendant to warrant the time and ex-
pense of a transfer motion.106  By comparison, fewer transfer motions
are filed in NDJ cases, implying that although patentees also some-
103 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1515 (“The plaintiff initially chooses the forum
by filing suit.  If the choice is too favorable to tolerate, the defendant moves to transfer.”).
104 The chi-square test used to examine the null hypothesis yielded a p-value of less than
0.0005.  “A p-value of less than 0.05 is generally interpreted as an indication that the null hypoth-
esis can be rejected (making it statistically significant), while a value greater than 0.10 is viewed
as showing that any differences are not statistically significant.”  Chien, supra note 29, at 1603–04
n.167.
105 Moore, supra note 2, at 897.
106 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1515.
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times select particularly favorable fora, they are doing so less often
than accused infringers.  In other words, when it comes to forum shop-
ping, it appears that accused infringers are more aggressive about se-
lecting particularly favorable fora than are patentees.
B. How Successful Is a Declaratory Judgment Action as a Forum
Shopping Tool?
Conventional wisdom holds that transfer motions are problematic
because the choice of forum is placed in the hands of the judge.107
Because the judge must consider many different factors,108 she will
generally transfer the case only when the balance of inconveniences is
quite lopsided.109  Moreover, courts tend to defer to a plaintiff’s choice
of forum.110  Thus, one would expect transfer rates to be low, regard-
less of whether cases are initiated by the patentee or the accused in-
fringer.111  Unexpectedly, the data show a marked difference in
transfer rates between DJ and NDJ cases.
Table 2 reports the total number of cases in the dataset (n = 2412)
and segregates the data by whether the case was a DJ case, and
whether the case was transferred.  The odds of being transferred were
calculated using logistic regression analysis, and are shown in Table 3.
TABLE 2. CASE TYPE BY TRANSFER STATUS (ALL CASES)
Number of Cases that
Stayed in the
Number of Cases Plaintiff’s Choice Total Number Percent of Cases
Case Type Transferred of Forum of Cases Transferred
DJ 45 290 335 13.4%
NDJ 126 1951 2077 6.1%
Total 171 2241 2412
107 Id. at 1516 (“[T]ransfer does not shift the choice of forum from plaintiff to defendant,
but instead from plaintiff to judge.”).
108 See supra Part I.D.
109 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1515 (“[T]he court will not transfer merely to
shift the inconvenience from the defendant to the plaintiff, the court will transfer when the
balance of inconveniences is really lopsided.”).
110 See supra Part I.D.
111 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1516 (“[T]he judge decides to transfer only in
rather extreme cases of forum-shopping, normally deferring to the presumption in favor of the
selected forum.”).
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TABLE 3. ODDS OF BEING TRANSFERRED (ALL CASES)
Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Limits P-Value
DJ 2.403 1.673; 3.451 < 0.0001
Filed
In 2008, NDJ cases had an overall transfer rate of 6.1%.112  This
result compares favorably with data from the Federal Judicial Center,
which shows that overall transfer rates in patent cases ranged from
4.1% to 6.0% between fiscal years 2005 and 2008.113
The overall transfer rate for 2008 DJ cases, on the other hand,
was 13.4%.114  Further, a DJ case is 2.4 times more likely to be trans-
ferred than an NDJ case.  This finding is statistically significant.115
Higher transfer rates are evidence of forum shopping activity.116
The finding that DJ cases have higher transfer rates than NDJ cases,
coupled with the previous finding that more transfer motions are filed
in DJ cases than in NDJ cases, bolsters the conclusion that declaratory
judgment actions are often filed to forum shop.
Furthermore, the higher transfer rate for DJ cases as opposed to
NDJ cases indicates that accused infringers are often unable to secure
their desired forum via declaratory judgment.117  The lower rate of
transfer for NDJ cases suggests that patentee-plaintiffs are more likely
to secure their desired forum when compared with accused infringer-
plaintiffs using declaratory judgment actions.
Why is the transfer rate for DJ cases so much higher?  One expla-
nation is that the selection of DJ cases is not a random or representa-
tive subset of all patent infringement disputes.118  That is, it is possible
that more declaratory judgment plaintiffs file suit for the purpose of
forum shopping, and patentee-defendants file transfer motions more
often in such suits, thereby increasing the rate of transfer.  Also, ac-
cused infringers could be using declaratory judgment actions to forum
112 This includes twenty-five uncontested transfers.
113 Janicke, supra note 2, at 19 (showing overall patent transfer rates for all districts).
These data include declaratory judgment actions. Id. at 19 n.81.  The federal government’s fiscal
year ends September 30. Id. at 24 n.94.
114 This includes two uncontested transfers.
115 See supra note 104.
116 Moore, supra note 2, at 915–16.
117 Declaratory judgment actions are filed by accused infringers in their desired forum, so
when a DJ case is transferred, the accused infringer loses its desired forum.
118 See Moore, supra note 2, at 922–23 (explaining the influence of selection effect theory
on analysis of patent litigation); David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1073, 1101–07 (2010) (explaining selection effect theory with respect to patent
litigation).
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shop more aggressively than patentees, again resulting in more trans-
fer motions and possibly increasing the transfer rate.  This concern
should be ameliorated by comparing only the cases in which motions
to transfer were filed, contested, and resolved.  This subset of cases
should have similar forum shopping risks and consequences, i.e., in
these cases, a defendant has incurred the time, effort, and expense to
litigate a transfer motion.
Accordingly, the dataset was narrowed to examine only DJ and
NDJ cases in which a transfer motion was filed, contested, and re-
solved.  Table 4 reports only those cases (n = 261) and segregates the
data by whether the case was a DJ case and whether the case was
transferred.  The odds of being transferred were calculated using lo-
gistic regression analysis, and are shown in Table 5.
TABLE 4. CASE TYPE BY TRANSFER STATUS
(CONTESTED MOTIONS ONLY)
Number of Cases that
Stayed in the Percentage of
Number of Cases Plaintiff’s Choice Total Number Cases
Case Type Transferred of Forum of Cases Transferred
DJ 43 28 71 60.6%
NDJ 101 89 190 53.2%
Total 144 117 261
TABLE 5. ODDS OF BEING TRANSFERRED
(CONTESTED MOTIONS ONLY)
Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Limits P-Value
DJ Filed 1.353 0.777, 2.357 0.2852
For the contested cases studied, a DJ case was 1.35 times more
likely to be transferred than an NDJ case.  This result further supports
the previous finding that DJ suits are more likely to be transferred
than NDJ suits, challenging the assumption that filing a DJ suit is the
optimal way for an accused infringer to forum shop.  Given the
smaller sample size, however, additional research is needed before
these findings can be extrapolated generally.119
There is an alternative way to view the data, given that accused
infringers seek different transfer outcomes depending on whether
they are the plaintiff or the defendant.120  On the one hand, bringing a
declaratory judgment suit as a plaintiff allows the accused infringer to
119 For a discussion of the limitations of this Study, see infra Part IV.A.
120 See supra Part I.C–I.D.
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make the initial forum selection, which can then be challenged by the
patentee-defendant.121  On the other hand, as a defendant, the accused
infringer can challenge the patentee-plaintiff’s forum selection by fil-
ing a transfer motion requesting an alternate forum.122  We can com-
pare how often the accused infringer proceeds in its favored forum
under these two scenarios.  That is, if an accused infringer files for
declaratory judgment and its choice of forum is challenged, does the
case proceed in the forum that the accused infringer initially selected?
Similarly, when the accused infringer files a transfer motion as a de-
fendant, how often is that motion granted?  An accused infringer’s
“forum success” can be calculated for both NDJ cases and DJ cases
and compared.
Forum success for accused infringers is defined differently de-
pending on whether the accused infringer is a plaintiff in a DJ case or
the defendant in an NDJ case.  As a plaintiff in a DJ case, the accused
infringer desires to stay in its chosen forum and therefore must suc-
cessfully oppose the patentee-defendant’s transfer motion.  As a de-
fendant in an NDJ case, the accused infringer seeks a transfer to
another forum and so must successfully win its own transfer motion.
Comparing forum success thus requires a comparison of the rate at
which transfer motions are granted in NDJ cases with the rate at
which transfer motions are denied in DJ cases.  Therefore, the forum
success rate reflects the likelihood that the accused infringer will ob-
tain its desired forum when forum is contested.
Table 6 reports only those cases in the dataset in which a transfer
motion was filed, contested, and resolved (n = 261), segregates the
data by whether the case was a DJ case and whether the case was
transferred, and assigns the forum success rate for the accused
infringer.
TABLE 6. ACCUSED INFRINGER FORUM SUCCESS RATE
(CONTESTED MOTIONS ONLY)
Number of Cases Forum Success
that Stayed in the Rate
Number of Cases Plaintiff’s Choice Total Number Percent of Cases (Accused
Case Type Transferred of Forum of Cases Transferred Infringer)
DJ 43 28 71 60.6% 39.4%
NDJ 101 89 190 53.2% 53.2%
Total 144 117 261
121 Hsu, supra note 54, at 94 (noting that declaratory judgment gives alleged infringers the
ability to choose a favorable forum).
122 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1515; see also Woodhouse, supra note 84, at
228 (noting that patentees choose to litigate in fora that substantively favor them).
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The data reveal a forum success rate for accused infringers of
53.2% in NDJ cases but only 39.4% in DJ cases.  Thus, when forum
was contested, an accused infringer was less likely to obtain its desired
forum as a declaratory judgment plaintiff.  This is a surprising, and
counterintuitive, result.  Prevailing wisdom holds that declaratory
judgment actions are an effective way for accused infringers to go on
the offensive by preemptively suing the patentee in the forum of their
choice.123  In theory, accused infringers would initiate litigation in this
way only in cases they think they should win.124  The expected strength
of these cases, coupled with the presumption in favor of plaintiff’s se-
lected forum,125 should give declaratory judgment plaintiffs an advan-
tage in a fight over forum.
C. Possible Explanations
Unexpectedly, when forum was contested, being a declaratory
judgment plaintiff did not give accused infringers an advantage.  This
Section views the data in light of some variables that might explain
this surprising result.
1. First-Filed Versus Second-Filed
Courts tend to defer to a plaintiff’s choice of forum.126  Although
the data presented in this Article cast some doubt on this general pro-
position, the Federal Circuit has stated that “the forum of the first-
filed case is favored, unless considerations of judicial and litigant
economy, and the just and effective disposition of disputes, require
otherwise.”127  Accordingly, the defendant must provide a “sound rea-
son that would make it unjust or inefficient to continue the first-filed
action.”128
Although declaratory judgment actions are usually preemptive
filings, in some cases, the potential infringer is not the first to file be-
cause the potential infringer may have lost the race to the court-
123 Moore, supra note 2, at 920.
124 See id.
125 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1515 (noting the presumption in favor of plain-
tiff’s choice of forum).
126 See Offen-Brown, supra note 39, at 65 (noting that first-filed suits traditionally receive
deference).
127 Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1993), abrogated in part
on other grounds by Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289 (1995).
128 Id. at 938. But see Micron Tech., Inc. v. Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 904 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (stating that courts should not automatically go with the first-filed action, but should con-
sider the convenience factors under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
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house129 or filed for declaratory judgment only after its customers
were sued.130  In cases where the declaratory judgment action is filed
second, we should expect less deference to the declaratory judgment
plaintiff’s choice of forum.
Table 7 reports only those DJ cases in the full dataset where a
transfer motion was filed (n = 86) and segregates the data by whether
the DJ case was filed first or second and whether the transfer was
granted, denied, or unresolved.
TABLE 7. DJ TRANSFER CASES BY FILING STATUS
Number of Number of Number of Forum
Total Number Transfers Transfers Transfers Success
Filing Status of Cases Granted Denied Unresolved Rate131
First-filed 38 16 19 3 54.3%
Second-filed 48 27 9 12 25%
Total 86 43 28 15
Indeed, when the data are segregated in this way, the forum suc-
cess rate for second-filed declaratory judgments falls to 25%.  But,
even when the declaratory judgment suit was filed first, the forum suc-
cess rate was 54.3%, only slightly greater than the 53.2% forum suc-
cess rate for transfer motions in NDJ cases.  These results support two
initial observations.  First, accused infringers that file for declaratory
judgment after the patentee has already filed its infringement suit
rarely get their desired forum if their choice of forum is challenged.
Second, even when second-filed declaratory judgment actions are ex-
cluded, declaratory judgment plaintiffs were no more successful at se-
curing their desired forum than defendants in NDJ cases when forum
was contested.  This is true despite the fact that declaratory judgment
plaintiffs should be afforded deference in their choice of forum.
2. Declaratory Judgment Plaintiff Not Named in
Infringement Suit
As discussed above, sometimes patentees do not name the pro-
ducers of allegedly infringing products in their infringement suits.132
129 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
130 See, e.g., Delphi Corp. v. Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc., No. 08-CV-11048, 2008 WL 2941116, at
*1 (E.D. Mich. July 25, 2008).
131 Unresolved transfer motions were not counted.
132 See supra Part I.C; see also, e.g., Complaint at 4–5, Auto Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. Delphi
Corp., 776 F. Supp. 2d 469 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (No. 2:08-CV-11048); Complaint, supra note 69, at
3; Complaint at 1, Alke B.V. v. L.B. White Co., 2008 WL 2447357 (W.D.N.C. June 13, 2008) (No.
3:08-CV88-C).
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In such situations, the party that is actually responsible for manufac-
turing the allegedly infringing product may file a declaratory judgment
action against the patentee as a way to initiate litigation.133  Given that
these second filers are the real parties of interest, one might expect
that these plaintiffs would be more successful at getting their desired
forum.
Table 8 reports only those DJ cases in the dataset where a trans-
fer motion was filed and where the DJ case was filed second (n = 48),
and segregates the data by whether the declaratory judgment plaintiff
was named in the patentee suit.
TABLE 8. WAS SECOND-TO-FILE DJ PLAINTIFF NAMED IN
PATENT SUIT?
Was Second-to-File
DJ Plaintiff Total Number of Number of Number of Forum
Named in Number of Transfers Transfers Transfers Success
Patentee Suit? Cases Granted Denied Unresolved Rate134
Yes 28 16 6 6 27.3%
No 20 11 3 6 21.4%
Total 48
Even with this unique procedural posture, the forum success rate
for these plaintiffs was a very low 21.4%—approximately the same
rate as for second-filed declaratory judgments.  Thus, among the cases
studied, even declaratory judgment plaintiffs that were not named in
the patentee’s infringement suit were unable to successfully oppose
transfer.
3. Size and Type of Moving and Opposing Party
Another variable affecting the results could be the size and type
of parties bringing declaratory judgment actions or transfer motions
and the size and type of parties opposing such motions.  That is, de-
claratory judgment suits may not be reliable forum shopping tools
overall, but they might be very reliable when used by or against cer-
tain types of parties.  It is possible that large companies are better able
than small companies to use declaratory judgment actions and transfer
motions to forum shop, given the high costs of initiating a lawsuit and
litigating a subsequent motion to transfer.135  Small patentees might
133 Ryan, supra note 70, at 186 (describing this kind of action as a “common patent-law fact
pattern”).  The data showed that 23.3% of declaratory judgment actions subject to transfer were
filed by plaintiffs that were not named in the parallel action. See supra Part III.C.1–2.
134 Unresolved transfer motions were not counted.
135 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1517 (“[T]ransferred cases tend to be big
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engage in more opportunistic litigation,136 triggering a corresponding
increase in declaratory judgments and transfer motions filed against
small patentees.
To account for party size, this Study placed all parties into one of
three categories: Large, Small, and Non-Practicing Entity (“NPE”).137
Large is defined as a public company, or a private company with over
$100 million in annual revenue.138  NPE refers to a patentee that does
not make products or practice its invention, but relies on its patents
for licensing revenue only.139  It is important to segregate NPEs be-
cause these entities use patent litigation for profit.140  Accordingly,
NPEs are often portrayed as forceful and opportunistic instigators of
patent litigation.141  Accused infringers might use declaratory judg-
ment actions to aggressively forum shop against NPEs because NPEs
are focused only on patent enforcement and not commercializing
products.  Parties that did not fit into either of the previous two cate-
gories, including individuals, nonprofits, and private companies with
annual revenues under $100 million, were coded as Small.  If there
were multiple coparties to a suit, it was assumed that the largest entity
was the real target or promulgator of the action.142
a. Moving Party Size
Categorizing the data by moving party size, Table 9 compares the
forum success rates for DJ cases where a motion to transfer was filed
(n = 86) with NDJ cases where a motion to transfer was filed
and serious disputes between litigious parties.”); see also Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting
the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44 J.L. & ECON. 573, 574 (2001) (noting that
small firms face a “particular difficulty of raising external funds to finance litigation”).
136 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 52, at 14, 17.
137 For a more detailed explanation of how parties were categorized and a more detailed
breakdown of the types of parties that bring declaratory judgment actions, see infra Appendix B.
138 See Chien, supra note 29, at 1597 & n.147 (explaining the $100 million threshold for the
large private company category).
139 Id. at 1577–79 (describing NPEs).  A party was coded as NPE “if the entity was de-
scribed by a court description, industry code, news article, entity website, or blog post as a non-
practicing enforcement/licensing entity, NPE, or troll.” Id. at 1596 (describing identification and
classification of NPEs); see also Liang, supra note 85, at 33–36 (describing NPEs).
140 Liang, supra note 85, at 33–35 (describing how NPEs use patent litigation to extract
settlements and licensing fees); see also Chien, supra note 29, at 1579 (“NPEs do not risk disrup-
tion to their core business—patent enforcement is their core business.” (emphasis added)).
141 Chien, supra note 29, at 1577–80 (explaining that NPEs often sue multiple defendants,
NPEs cannot be countersued for infringement as they have no products of their own, and NPEs
are accused of asserting weak patents).
142 See id. at 1598 (using similar categorization methods).
2012] OFFENSIVE VENUE 1091
(n = 275).143  Table 9 starts with all cases in which a transfer motion
was filed (as shown in Table 1), but separates all unresolved transfer
motions so that only contested cases are used to calculate forum suc-
cess rate (as shown in Table 6).
TABLE 9. ACCUSED INFRINGER FORUM SUCCESS RATE BY SIZE OF
ACCUSED INFRINGER
Number of Number of Number of
Accused Number of Transfer Transfer Transfer
Infringer Transfer Motions Motions Motions Forum
Case Type Size Motions Filed Granted Denied Unresolved Success Rate
DJ Large 58 27 22 9 44.9%
Small 28 16 6 6 27.3%
Total 86
NDJ Large 143 61 46 36 57%
Small 132 43 40 49 51.8%
Total 275
As shown in Table 9, when the data are controlled for accused
infringer size, being a declaratory judgment plaintiff did not give the
accused infringer an advantage when forum was contested.  This is
particularly true for Small accused infringers that have a much higher
forum success rate as defendants than as declaratory judgment plain-
tiffs.  Even Large corporate accused infringers, that presumably have
the resources to successfully procure their desired forum, had better
forum success rates as defendants than as declaratory judgment
plaintiffs.
b. Opposing Party Size
Categorizing the data by opposing party size, Table 10 compares
DJ cases where a transfer motion was filed (n = 86) with NDJ cases
where a transfer motion was filed (n = 275).  Only contested cases
were used to calculate forum success rate.
143 Because forum success rate measures the rate at which an accused infringer successfully
obtains the forum of its choice, accused infringer-plaintiffs filing for declaratory judgment must
be compared with accused infringer-defendants filing a motion to transfer in an NDJ case.
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TABLE 10. ACCUSED INFRINGER FORUM SUCCESS RATE BY SIZE
OF PATENTEE
Number of Number of Number of
Number of Transfer Transfer Transfer
Patentee Transfer Motions Motions Motions Forum
Case Type Size Motions Filed Granted Denied Unresolved Success Rate
DJ Large 33 16 13 4 44.8%
Small 31 16 6 9 27.3%
NPE 22 11 9 2 45%
Total 86
NDJ Large 69 26 16 27 61.9%
Small 116 39 42 35 48.1%
NPE 90 36 31 23 53.7%
Total 275
As can be seen from Table 10, when forum was contested, an ac-
cused infringer’s status as a declaratory judgment plaintiff did not help
it, regardless of the size and type of the opposing party.  Accused in-
fringers were more successful as defendants even when the opposing
party was Large and presumably had the resources to vigorously op-
pose the transfer motion.  Being a declaratory judgment plaintiff did
not give accused infringers any advantage against an NPE, despite the
reputation of NPEs for engaging in aggressive and opportunistic litiga-
tion tactics.144
Given the discrepancy in forum success rates, it appears that ac-
cused infringers get no advantage from being a declaratory judgment
plaintiff when forum is contested, regardless of moving party size or
opposing party size.
4. Judicial District: The Eastern District of Texas
A final variable to consider is the variation in transfer rates
among particular districts.  It could be, for example, that a particular
district rarely grants transfers, and so, if an accused infringer wishes to
avoid a particular district, it would be better off filing a declaratory
judgment action in its preferred district rather than filing a transfer
motion that is doomed to fail.
In patent litigation, the district that matters is the Eastern District
of Texas.145  The Eastern District of Texas is the favored forum for
144 Chien, supra note 29, at 1579–80 (noting that NPEs surprise their targets, sue multiple
defendants, and assert weak patents).
145 See Leychkis, supra note 44, at 205–15 (explaining how the Eastern District of Texas has
attracted so much patent litigation); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia’s “Renegade Jurisdic-
tion”: Lessons for Patent Law Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 111, 134–42 (2008) (detailing how the
Eastern District of Texas actively transformed itself into an accessible and knowledgeable court
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patentee plaintiffs,146 and, in 2008, it was the district with the largest
number of patent suit filings in the country.147  Patent plaintiffs favor
the Eastern District of Texas because it has knowledgeable judges ex-
perienced in patent cases, special patent procedural rules that result in
quick and relatively inexpensive trials, and plaintiff-friendly juries.148
Defendants, on the other hand, suffer under the district’s “pro-paten-
tee bias.”149  The district’s judges tend not to grant summary judg-
ment,150 and, according to some observers, are particularly hostile
toward transfer motions.151  With “defendant-hostile juries and scarce
opportunities for transfer, stay or summary judgment,” the Eastern
District of Texas is “about the worst place in the country” to litigate
for an accused infringer.152  Facing such grim odds, perhaps an accused
infringer rationally files for declaratory judgment in its desired forum,
rather than file and fight a transfer motion that is sure to be denied.
with strong expertise in solving patent disputes); Offen-Brown, supra note 39, at 69–72 (showing
the rise in patent filings in the Eastern District of Texas between 2000 and 2009).
146 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 404 (noting that patent plaintiffs have flocked “en masse”
to the Eastern District of Texas in the last several years); Leychkis, supra note 44, at 206 (“Plain-
tiff patent holders and their attorneys love the Eastern District of Texas.”).
147 Paul M. Janicke, Venue Transfers From the Eastern District of Texas: Case by Case or an
Endemic Problem?, LANDSLIDE, Mar./Apr. 2010, at 16 (stating that the Eastern District of Texas
is the district “with the largest number of patent suit filings in the United States”); see also
Lemley, supra note 1, at 421 (noting that the Eastern District of Texas is tied for fifth in a
ranking of all districts by number of patent cases litigated in the last decade).
148 Leychkis, supra note 44, at 205; see also Janicke, supra note 147, at 17 (stating that the
Eastern District of Texas “has almost uniformly been seen as more pro-plaintiff and more pro-
patent than any other district in the country”). But see Lemley, supra note 1, at 410, 415 (noting
that the Eastern District of Texas is not a top five district for average plaintiff win rate, and that
it is “among the slowest jurisdictions” when sorted by time to total resolution).
149 Leychkis, supra note 44, at 216. But see Andrei Iancu & Jay Chung, Real Reasons the
Eastern District of Texas Draws Patent Cases—Beyond Lore and Anecdote, 14 SMU SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 299, 303–08 (2011) (arguing that there are no data to support jury bias in the
Eastern District of Texas, and that the appellate affirmance rate of cases from the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas is higher than in many other popular patent districts).
150 See Leychkis, supra note 44, at 216 (noting that patent holders win seventy-five percent
of bench trials in the district, compared to forty-seven percent nationwide, and that the district
has the lowest rate of summary judgments in patent cases in the U.S.).
151 See id. (“While the national average [transfer rate] is close to 50%[,] . . . the Eastern
District of Texas grants only one in every three motions to transfer venue.”); Offen-Brown,
supra note 39, at 72–74 (noting the district’s “low” transfer rate of 32.1%); Li Zhu, Note, Taking
Off: Recent Changes to Venue Transfer of Patent Litigation in the Rocket Docket, 11 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 901, 905 (2010) (noting that in the past, transfers “were rarely granted” in the
Eastern District of Texas). But see Janicke, supra note 2, at 4–5 (finding that patent cases were
transferred out of the Eastern District of Texas at rates higher than the national average in 2005,
2007, and 2008).
152 Leychkis, supra note 44, at 215–17.
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To determine the effect that the Eastern District of Texas may
have on forum shopping activity, data were gathered on DJ cases
where the patentee-defendant filed a motion to transfer to the East-
ern District of Texas.  Such an approach identifies those cases that
would have likely been filed in the Eastern District of Texas to begin
with, had the patentee been able to file first.
Table 11 reports all DJ cases in the full dataset where a transfer
motion was filed (n = 86), categorized by whether the transfer motion
requested transfer of the DJ case to the Eastern District of Texas.
TABLE 11. DJ TRANSFER CASES WHERE TRANSFER TO EASTERN
DISTRICT OF TEXAS WAS REQUESTED
Did Transfer Motion Filed in
DJ Case Request Eastern Total Number Percent of Motions that




Patentee-defendants moving to transfer a DJ case to another dis-
trict requested the Eastern District of Texas as the transferee forum
34.9% of the time.  This suggests that many patentees do in fact prefer
to litigate in the Eastern District of Texas.
In order to compare this figure with NDJ cases, all NDJ cases
filed in the Eastern District of Texas in which a transfer motion was
also filed were collected.  Table 12 reports all NDJ cases in the full
dataset where a transfer motion was filed (n = 275), categorized by
whether the NDJ case was filed in the Eastern District of Texas.
TABLE 12. NDJ TRANSFER CASES FILED IN EASTERN
DISTRICT OF TEXAS
Was NDJ Transfer Case Percent of Cases Filed




The data show that 31.6% of all NDJ cases in the dataset that
were subject to a transfer motion were originally filed in the Eastern
District of Texas.  In other words, one-third of the accused infringers
seeking transfer are trying to get out of the Eastern District of Texas.
These results suggest that the Eastern District of Texas has a
strong influence on forum shopping activity: Patentees are trying to
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get into the Eastern District, and accused infringers are trying to get
out.  Table 13 compares the forum success rate for accused infringers
opposing a transfer to the Eastern District of Texas in a DJ case
(n = 30) with those trying to get out of the Eastern District via transfer
motion in an NDJ case (n = 87).
TABLE 13. FORUM SUCCESS RATE FOR ACCUSED INFRINGERS
AVOIDING THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
Total Number of Number of Number of
Number of Transfers Transfers Transfers Forum
Case Type Cases Granted Denied Unresolved Success Rate









When forum was contested, accused infringers did not improve
their odds of avoiding the Eastern District of Texas by filing a declara-
tory judgment action.  The forum success rate for accused infringers in
DJ cases was 42.3%, which means that accused infringers successfully
opposed a motion to transfer to the Eastern District, thereby keeping
their originally chosen forum, only 42.3% of the time.
By contrast, when an accused infringer in an NDJ case filed a
motion to transfer out of the Eastern District of Texas, the forum suc-
cess rate was 48%.  This number is higher than the transfer rates pre-
viously reported by some commentators,153 although prior studies may
have underreported the transfer grant rate in the Eastern District of
Texas by relying only on published cases.154  The 48% forum success
rate for accused infringers filing motions to transfer found in this
Study is consistent with a recent study by Professor Paul M. Janicke,
which found that the Eastern District’s transfer grant rate was 47%
for the 2007 fiscal year.155  Janicke’s study did not rely only on pub-
lished cases, but instead used more complete data from the Federal
153 See supra note 151 and accompanying text; see also Liang, supra note 85, at 53–54.
154 See, e.g., Liang, supra note 85, at 53–54 (using cases reported on Westlaw to calculate a
transfer grant rate of 30.6% to 34.1%).
155 Janicke, supra note 2, at 22–23.  The success rate was initially calculated as sixty-eight
percent, including ten patent infringement suits filed by the same plaintiff. Id.  If these ten cases
were counted as a single dispute, the rate drops to forty-seven percent. Id.
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Judicial Center and the IPLC.156  Indeed, Janicke found that the East-
ern District of Texas has consistently transferred patent cases at
higher rates than other districts,157 and he argues that the perception
that transfers out of the Eastern District are impossible has “little to
no ground to support it.”158
The total number of cases in the instant dataset is too small to
definitively conclude that the forum success rate for accused infringers
trying to avoid the Eastern District of Texas is in fact lower for DJ
cases than for NDJ cases.  Additional data will be needed to confirm
these transfer rates, and the data reported herein should be consid-
ered a starting point for further research.  Still, based on these initial
findings, if an accused infringer’s goal is to avoid the Eastern District
of Texas, declaratory judgment actions do not appear to offer a signifi-
cant advantage in this regard.
In summary, DJ cases are 2.4 times more likely to be transferred
than NDJ cases.159  When forum is contested, an accused infringer gets
no advantage by being a declaratory judgment plaintiff, and, in fact,
has lower forum success rates among the cases studied.160  These lower
forum success rates hold steady even when variables such as timing of
suit, party size and type, and judicial district are considered.161
IV. DISCUSSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This Article reports new data on the prevalence of forum shop-
ping by accused infringers.  In the majority of cases, forum is not con-
tested, but forum is much more likely to be contested in declaratory
judgment cases than in nondeclaratory judgment cases.162  When fo-
rum is contested, accused infringers who filed for declaratory judg-
ment are less likely to litigate in their desired forum.163  Before delving
too far into the implications of this finding, the limitations of this
Study are discussed below.
156 Id. at 19 & n.82 (explaining that data were drawn from the Federal Judicial Center and
Stanford’s IP Litigation Clearinghouse (“Lex Machina”)).
157 Id. at 4–5 (noting higher rates of transfer in fiscal years 2005, 2007, and 2008).
158 Janicke, supra note 147, at 19.
159 See supra Part III.B.
160 See supra Part III.B.
161 See supra Part III.C.
162 See supra Part III.A.
163 See supra Part III.B.
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A. Study Limitations
It should first be acknowledged that this Article takes no position
on whether forum shopping is good or bad.  Some commentators ar-
gue that forum shopping creates uncertainty and inconsistency in the
application of the law, thereby eroding confidence in the law and its
enforcement.164  To the extent that win rates differ across districts, the
normative force of patent law suffers.165  Forum shopping may also
create inefficiencies by wasting resources on fights over forum, rather
than spending resources on substantive issues.166
Others argue that fights over forum are worthwhile because
transfers yield “considerable savings through the diminution of error
costs,”167 and also that forum shopping is simply “a response to the
market demand for faster, cheaper, and more predictable forums for
patent litigation.”168  Regardless of one’s position with respect to fo-
rum shopping, however, it is clear that until a plaintiff’s ability to
choose a forum is restricted, all parties will forum shop.169  Because
such restrictions are unlikely, this Article focuses on the forum shop-
ping behavior of accused patent infringers to see how they are forum
shopping, and whether they are successful, in order to inform the con-
tinuing debate over the pros and cons of forum shopping.
Addressing other relevant limitations, this Study observed only
those declaratory judgment cases filed in 2008 in association with pat-
ent litigation.170  Accordingly, the discussed implications are not nec-
164 See Moore, supra note 2, at 924; see also Fromer, supra note 3, at 1465.
165 Fromer, supra note 3, at 1464–65.
166 Moore, supra note 2, at 924–26.
167 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1525 (“[T]ransfer removes unjust forum ad-
vantage and thereby produces more accurate outcomes.”).
168 Meehan, supra note 3, at 13.
169 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 402 (stating that both plaintiffs and accused infringers fo-
rum shop); Janicke, supra note 2, at 26 (noting that as long as plaintiffs can make the initial
determination of where to sue, forum shopping by plaintiffs will continue, and that defendants
who file transfer motions are also forum shopping); see also Atkinson et al., supra note 13, at 441
(“Forum shopping is not an ill, in and of itself, but is a symptom of nonuniformity.”); Patrick E.
Higginbotham, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, EDTX and Transfer of Venue:
Move Over, Federal Circuit—Here is the Fifth Circuit’s Law on Transfer of Venue, Keynote
Address at the Southern Methodist University Science and Technology Law Review Symposium:
Emerging Intellectual Property Issues: Eastern District of Texas and Patents (Feb. 18, 2011), in
14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 191, 197 (2011) (“There is nothing illegal, improper, or unjust
about a plaintiff deciding to go to a forum where he thinks a jury is more generous[,] . . . where
he thinks the judges are better, or whether he just thinks that is where [he] want[s] to be.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
170 Contrast this with a hypothetical experimental study that attempts to ascertain whether
judges are more likely to transfer declaratory judgment cases as opposed to nondeclaratory judg-
ment cases.
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essarily descriptive inferences about declaratory judgment suits in
general.171  Without additional data from several more years, these re-
sults cannot be conclusively applied to all patent declaratory judgment
suits.  But, as explained above, restricting the data to the year 2008
allowed the cases to progress enough so that transfer motions could be
made, resolved, and observed.172  Thus, this Study presents significant
initial findings that should be supplemented with further data collec-
tion and analysis.
Furthermore, there may be an unknown selection bias inherent in
the selection of patent infringement cases filed only in 2008.173  Al-
though every declaratory judgment patent case filed in 2008 was ana-
lyzed and transfer rates were compared with nondeclaratory judgment
patent cases filed that year, it is possible that cases filed in 2008 differ
in some significant way from patent cases filed in other years.  For
example, more declaratory judgment patent cases may have been filed
in 2008 than normal, though the numbers found in this Study correlate
well with prior studies.174  The declaratory judgment cases filed in 2008
could also be weaker on the merits when compared with cases filed in
prior years, resulting in higher transfer rates.  Even if this were true,
however, the cases in which transfer motions are filed are most likely
to be the cases in which the parties substantially disagree on the ap-
propriate forum.175  If the circumstances clearly favor one side, eco-
nomically rational behavior dictates that the parties will agree to a
transfer to avoid transaction costs.176  The cases where a transfer mo-
tion is litigated and resolved by the judge are likely to be the closer
cases in which the parties disagree on the predicted outcome.177
Therefore, even if the cases filed in 2008 are weaker than cases filed in
other years, examining just those cases where a transfer motion was
litigated and resolved should mitigate any unknown selection bias.
It should also be noted that the accused infringer’s choice of fo-
rum may not be contested, and accused infringers have higher win
171 See Epstein & King, supra note 96, at 29–34 (explaining descriptive inferences and their
limitations).
172 Some cases filed in 2008 were not transferred until 2010. See, e.g., Motiva LLC v.
Nintendo Co., No. 6:08-cv-00429-LED (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2010) (case filed on Nov. 10, 2008, and
transferred to the Western District of Washington on March 1, 2010, as mandated by In re
Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
173 See Epstein & King, supra note 96, at 111 (noting that data will not yield unbiased
inferences if the data systematically differ from the population).
174 See supra Part III.C.
175 See Moore, supra note 2, at 922–23 (explaining selection effect theory).
176 See id. (describing selection effect theory as it related to cases that go to trial).
177 See id.
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rates at trial as declaratory judgment plaintiffs than as defendants.178
Thus, it may be worthwhile for an accused infringer to file a declara-
tory judgment action even given the likelihood of transfer.179  Moreo-
ver, the discussion that follows focuses on forum selection as if that
were the sole reason for an accused infringer to file for a declaratory
judgment, which oversimplifies the calculus.180  There are many other
reasons why a declaratory judgment plaintiff might file suit.  For ex-
ample, an accused infringer might file when negotiations between the
parties over a potential license have irreparably broken down.181  An
accused infringer might also file to improve bargaining position or to
intimidate the patentee.182  Or perhaps a potential infringer might file
suit—knowing that the probability of success is low—in order to
threaten the patentee’s solvency or to force the patentee out of the
market.183  These other motivations are worthy of further study.  Re-
gardless of the underlying motivation for a declaratory judgment suit,
however, the coercive power of the suit derives from the accused in-
fringer’s ability to choose the forum and the time the suit will begin.184
Accordingly, it is appropriate to look at whether declaratory judgment
actions are reliably giving accused infringers their choice of forum, as
this Study attempts to do.
B. Implications
With these limitations in mind, the data indicate that declaratory
judgment cases are transferred at a much higher rate than
178 See Moore, supra note 6, at 368.
179 See supra Part III.B.
180 Hsu, supra note 54, at 96–97 (listing various advantages of filing a declaratory judgment
action).
181 See Chuang, supra note 32, at 904 (“[T]he classic scenario that leads to a request for
declaratory relief is a failed attempt to license the patent-at-issue.”).
182 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495,
1505 (2001) (noting that suits can be used as settlement strategies, “forcing the other side to the
bargaining table”); Paul J. LaVanway, Jr., Note, Patent Licensing and Discretion: Reevaluating
the Discretionary Prong of Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction After MedImmune, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 1966, 1975 & n.65 (2008); see also Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497
F.3d 1271, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing the district court’s conclusion that the suit was filed as
“an intimidation tactic,” but reversing that court’s denial of declaratory judgment jurisdiction).
183 See Chien, supra note 29, at 1587–89 (discussing “patent predation,” where established
companies use patent litigation “to impose distress on financially disadvantaged rivals”); Stuart
J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008
Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1315–16 (2009) (describing “bullying”
suits that attempt to put startup companies out of business); Michael J. Meurer, Controlling
Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 517–25
(2003) (describing opportunistic and anticompetitive intellectual property lawsuits).
184 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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nondeclaratory judgment cases, and that when forum is contested, de-
claratory judgment plaintiffs are not successfully obtaining their de-
sired forum.185  Thus, continued use of declaratory judgment actions to
forum shop has the potential to substantially impact the unpredictabil-
ity and cost of patent litigation.  Accordingly, patent attorneys need to
reevaluate their use of declaratory judgment and educate their clients
on its risks and costs.
1. Increased Unpredictability
Unpredictable and inconsistent application of law is a major con-
cern in patent cases.186  As stated by now-Judge Kimberly Moore: “If
the property owner’s ability to enforce her patent is inefficient or un-
predictable, the patent’s value decreases for the patent owner, com-
petitors, and the public thereby stifling innovation and
competition.”187  This could happen in two ways.  First, competitors
may accord the patent too little respect, decreasing the value of the
patent as a means for promoting innovation and increasing transaction
costs.188  Second, competitors could treat the patent as broader than it
actually is, thereby reducing their own innovative behavior for fear of
infringing and eliminating competition.189
If accused infringers mistakenly believe that declaratory judg-
ment actions can be used reliably to secure their favored forum, it
becomes more difficult for parties to predict outcomes.190  For exam-
ple, an accused infringer may determine, after considering win rates
and the average time to trial, that the best forum for her case is the
District of Delaware.  Based on historical data available for similar
cases filed in that district, she can make a reasonable forecast of litiga-
tion costs and likely outcome.191  But as shown in this Article, if the
accused infringer files a declaratory judgment action in the District of
Delaware and that forum choice is challenged, the case has a good
185 See supra Part III.B.
186 See Moore, supra note 2, at 927–28 (explaining harmful effects of uncertainty on patent
law); see also Meehan, supra note 3, at 3–4 (explaining how uncertainty might increase the
amount of infringement that occurs.).
187 Moore, supra note 2, at 928.
188 See id. at 928–29 (arguing that when parties do not respect patents, their value de-
creases); see also Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21–22 (explain-
ing how parties ignore patents).
189 Moore, supra note 2, at 929; see also Woodhouse, supra note 84, at 236 (noting that
disparate judicial outcomes can cause overcompliance or undercompliance with patent rights).
190 See Vanegas, supra note 55, at 376 (“[T]he accused infringer should receive the benefit
of forum selection for incurring the costs of commencing the litigation.”).
191 See generally Lemley, supra note 1.
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chance of being transferred to another district in which the accused
infringer did not anticipate litigating.192  This makes it difficult for the
accused infringer to predict the likely outcome of the case.  When par-
ties cannot predict outcomes, they are more likely to litigate.193  This
diverts resources from research and development to litigation and
transaction costs, which is not the intended goal of the patent
system.194
2. Increased Cost
As a forum shopping tool, declaratory judgment actions are also
more costly than transfer motions.  A declaratory judgment action is
usually a preemptive filing, and therefore the accused infringer incurs
the cost to file a suit in the forum of her choice without being com-
pletely certain that the patentee would have actually filed suit.195  It is
possible that the patentee would never have sued, and that the ac-
cused infringer would not have needed to incur this cost at all.  If the
patentee does subsequently sue, parallel litigation will result, which
will require the parties to incur the costs of appearing and litigating in
two districts at once, at least until the forum issue is settled.196  Parallel
litigation also imposes extra costs on the judicial system because two
192 See supra Part III.B.
193 See Leychkis, supra note 44, at 232 (arguing that forum shopping reduces overall pre-
dictability of the system and leads to more expensive litigation); Moore, supra note 2, at 927;
Woodhouse, supra note 84, at 236–37 (describing the situation where parties may be less willing
to settle because of forum, resulting in unnecessary and inefficient litigation costs).
194 Moore, supra note 2, at 928. But see Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)certainty, Legal
Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109, 1142–44 (2010) (stating that lawyers prefer
uncertainty because it enhances the value of their services).
195 The chance of suit by the patentee, however, cannot be merely speculative. See supra
notes 56–63 and accompanying text.  In order for a court to have subject matter jurisdiction,
there generally must first be some affirmative act by the patent owner relating to enforcement of
its patent rights. See, e.g., Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1338–39 (Fed.
Cir. 2008); SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(“[J]urisdiction generally will not arise merely on the basis that a party learns of the existence of
a patent owned by another or even perceives such a patent to pose a risk of infringement, with-
out some affirmative act by the patentee.”).  Moreover, “although a party need not have en-
gaged in the actual manufacture or sale of a potentially infringing product to obtain a
declaratory judgment of non-infringement, there must be a showing of meaningful preparation
for making or using that product.”  Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 880–81
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[W]hether there has been meaningful
preparation to conduct potentially infringing activity remains an important element in the total-
ity of circumstances which must be considered in determining whether a declaratory judgment is
appropriate.”).
196 Ryan, supra note 70, at 189–90 (noting that declaratory judgment actions increase the
risk of duplicative litigation).
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judges, and their respective courts, must work on the same case, re-
sulting in wasteful, duplicative efforts.197
The appeal of filing a declaratory judgment suit is even more dif-
ficult to explain when the accused infringer is the second to file.  In
such a scenario, the accused infringer is voluntarily initiating parallel
litigation in another forum, which is a waste of time and effort from a
forum shopping perspective.198  Yet, despite the dismal success rate,
significant numbers of such cases are filed.199
A transfer motion, on the other hand, is filed by the accused in-
fringer in a case in which she has already incurred the costs to appear;
so, the cost of the motion is merely incremental.200  Moreover, there is
no risk of parallel litigation because the case will proceed in a differ-
ent forum only after the transfer motion is granted.201  Accordingly, a
transfer motion is a less costly way to forum shop when compared
with a declaratory judgment action because an accused infringer only
incurs the incremental cost to file the transfer motion in a case that
she is already defending, and she need only focus on litigating in one
forum at a time.
Litigants and courts already expend significant resources on
fights over forum.202  Indiscriminate use of declaratory judgment ac-
tions to forum shop unnecessarily increases the cost of wasteful litiga-
tion over forum because accused infringers that file for declaratory
judgment get no advantage if forum is contested.203  Because most of
the cost of patent litigation falls on innovators, these costs constitute a
disincentive to innovate because resources spent on wasteful litigation
are necessarily diverted from technological innovation.204  Adding
197 See Linda J. Silberman, The Impact of Jurisdictional Rules and Recognition Practice on
International Business Transactions: The U.S. Regime, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 327, 344 (2004).
198 The forum success rate for second-filed declaratory judgment actions is twenty-five per-
cent. See supra Table 7.
199 Of eighty-six declaratory judgment cases subject to transfer, forty-eight were filed after
the patentee filed a parallel suit. See supra Tables 7–8.
200 Defendants are likely to file a transfer motion “almost as a matter of course” when a
“colorable argument” exists.  Steinberg, supra note 8, at 464.
201 Professor David Steinberg notes that judges receive the benefit of a less crowded docket
when they transfer a case. Id. at 471.  This is not to suggest that transfer motions are costless.
The transferee judge must familiarize herself with the facts of the case, repeating work already
done by the transferor judge.  Id. at 452.  New local counsel must also be obtained and will have
to familiarize herself with the case. Id.
202 See Moore, supra note 2, at 926 (“In short, it costs money to fight over forum, and it
takes time for the court to handle these transfer motions.”).
203 See id. at 925 (“[F]orum shopping wastes resources by increasing litigation costs as par-
ties dispute forum or pursue the most favorable forum . . . .”); supra Part III.B.
204 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 27, at 56, 127, 141–42 (“[P]atent litigation is a real prob-
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costs onto the already substantial cost of patent litigation will only
further impede innovation.  Moreover, the parallel litigation that
often results when an accused infringer attempts to forum shop via
declaratory judgment adversely affects the judicial system as a whole
by contributing to already congested dockets.205  Litigants and wit-
nesses must bear costs on two fronts, giving the advantage to large
parties with superior resources and increasing the risk of opportunistic
behavior.206  Judicial resources are also wasted through duplication.207
3. Possible Solutions
First, requests for declaratory relief in patent litigation should be
carefully monitored by the courts.  For example, when a declaratory
judgment plaintiff files her case with the clear intent to forum shop,
courts should carefully consider whether personal jurisdiction over the
patentee would be appropriate.208  Furthermore, even when jurisdic-
tion exists, the Declaratory Judgment Act expressly gives courts the
discretion to decide whether to take the case.209  Courts can use their
discretion to evaluate whether the declaratory judgment action fur-
thers the goal of the Act—to reduce legal uncertainty210—and the goal
of the patent system—to promote innovation.211  A declaratory judg-
lem for innovators and it does impose a cost on investment in innovation.”); see also Meehan,
supra note 3, at 3–4 (describing how litigation diverts resources from innovation).
205 See Silberman, supra note 197, at 344 (describing how judicial resources are wasted by
duplication); Steinberg, supra note 8, at 470–71 (describing docket pressures faced by judges).
206 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1516 (“Forum-shopping might be in use by the
strong against the weak.”); see also Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 135, at 575–76 (arguing that
preliminary injunctions tend to be used by large firms hoping to impose financial distress on
smaller rivals).
207 Silberman, supra note 197, at 344.
208 See La Belle, supra note 64, at 96 (arguing that personal jurisdiction in patent declara-
tory judgment actions should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis); Weide, supra note 64, at 187
(arguing that patent policy is an important consideration when deciding whether personal juris-
diction is warranted).
209 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006) (amended 2010) (stating that “any court of the United States . . .
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party” (emphasis added)); see
Chuang, supra note 32, at 903–06 (discussing courts’ discretion with respect to declaratory judg-
ment actions).
210 See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 129 (2007) (noting that the di-
lemma of “putting the challenger to the choice between abandoning his rights or risking prosecu-
tion . . . is a dilemma that it was the very purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to
ameliorate” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Sidley &
Austin, 702 F. Supp. 207, 210 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (“Declaratory judgments are available to potential
defendants who wish to reduce uncertainty created by the ability of potential plaintiffs to dictate
when litigation commences.”).
211 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Chuang, supra note 32, at 921.
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ment suit filed solely for forum shopping purposes would likely not
further either of these goals.
Second, and more important, parties need to be educated about
the appropriate use of declaratory judgment actions.  Patent attorneys
have a duty to provide accurate information to their clients so that
declaratory judgment suits are only filed when they align with their
client’s strategic goals.212  Part of this educational process requires dis-
pelling misconceptions that certain judicial districts are “event hori-
zons,” i.e., boundaries in space beyond which nothing can escape.213
When faced with a possible suit in one of these event horizon districts,
accused infringers irrationally refuse to defend in them for fear that
they will never be able to get out.214  So, rather than filing a transfer
motion in the undesirable forum, accused infringers stay as far away
from the district as possible by filing for a declaratory judgment action
in their preferred forum.  Although this approach has some intuitive
appeal, this Study shows that it is flawed, especially if the declaratory
judgment action is filed second.215  The perception that it is impossible
to get a patent infringement case transferred out of the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas, for example, is wrong.216  The data show that accused
infringers should not fear filing transfer motions in undesirable fora.217
Moreover, using a transfer motion, rather than initiating a parallel
proceeding via a declaratory judgment action, incurs lower litigation
costs and places less of a burden on the judicial system.  It is therefore
essential that attorneys discuss the respective forum success rates for
declaratory judgment actions and transfer motions with their clients,
so that clients can carefully consider their purposes for filing a declar-
atory judgment suit and make an informed decision.
To be clear, this Article does not advocate abandoning declara-
tory judgment actions altogether.  Instead, this Article challenges
212 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2003) (“A lawyer shall explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions re-
garding the representation.”).
213 See STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 89 (1988); see also Eric E. John-
son, The Black Hole Case: The Injunction Against the End of the World, 76 TENN. L. REV. 819,
821 (2009) (discussing event horizons in the context of plaintiffs trying to enjoin the Large
Hadron Collider’s operation).
214 Cf. Higginbotham, supra note 169, at 199 (noting that counsel perceive the Eastern
District of Texas as “a bad place to be,” and think, “‘[i]t is down in East Texas for heaven’s sake,
we cannot be there.’”).
215 See supra Part III.B–C.1.
216 See supra Part III.C.4; see also Janicke, supra note 2, at 23 (noting that the perception of
impossibility has “little validity.”).
217 See supra Part III.B.
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long-standing assumptions with respect to the value of declaratory
judgment actions in order to reduce their inefficient use.218  Indeed,
the implications of this Study can be applied to other areas of law as
well.  There may be other well-accepted litigation practices that are
not cost effective when examined empirically.  Lawyers may even pro-
mote such practices to maintain demand for their services and justify
higher fees.219  Attorneys have an ethical duty to learn the true costs,
risks, and benefits of their litigation practices and share this knowl-
edge with their clients.220  Additional studies questioning these ineffi-
cient practices are needed so that clients will have the knowledge
required to make truly informed decisions about litigation strategy.
CONCLUSION
Everyone in patent litigation is forum shopping.  Given the clear
differences in outcomes among the various federal districts, it would
be irrational not to forum shop.  Declaratory judgment actions are tra-
ditionally assumed to be the best way for accused infringers to play
the forum shopping game, but this Article presents new evidence
questioning that assumption.  Declaratory judgment suits are being
transferred at a much higher rate than nondeclaratory judgment suits.
Among the cases studied, accused infringers that filed for declaratory
judgment did not have an advantage when forum was contested.  This
result is all the more surprising because transfer motions were thought
to be difficult for accused infringer-defendants to win—another per-
ception refuted by the data presented here.
Because there is a paucity of data on the use of declaratory judg-
ment in patent litigation, further research on this topic is warranted.
Still, the snapshot presented herein provides new insight into the fo-
rum shopping behavior of patent litigants, informing the important
debate surrounding forum shopping and our understanding of patent
litigation in general.  Accused infringers need to reevaluate their use
of declaratory judgment actions, especially because declaratory judg-
ment actions are a more costly and burdensome way to forum shop
218 See Woodhouse, supra note 84, at 237 (“In some situations, even the perception of dis-
parate outcomes or unfair treatment . . . may lead parties to change their behavior in inefficient
ways.”).
219 See Mullally, supra note 194, at 1144–45 (noting that patent lawyers have an incentive to
perpetuate uncertainty); see also Steinberg, supra note 8, at 524 (arguing that lawyers are the
only actors to benefit substantially from complex transfer litigation); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Eco-
nomic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1706 (2008) (“For lawyers,
transaction costs are a benefit, because they are a source of their income.”).
220 See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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than transfer motions.  If accused infringers blindly file declaratory
judgment suits based on the incorrect perception that it is the best way
to forum shop, they are unnecessarily increasing unpredictability and
their own litigation costs, thereby reducing the number of resources
that can be used for innovation.
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APPENDIX A: SELECTION AND CODING OF THE DATASET
This Appendix includes information about how the datasets were
selected and coded.
First, data were gathered for all patent infringement suits filed in
2008 by using the IPLC’s predefined search criteria.  The dataset was
then checked manually to eliminate cases that did not bring a patent
infringement claim.221  This dataset was then manually divided into
two distinct subsets: cases initiated by declaratory judgment actions
and cases initiated by the patentee.  Finally, the dataset was manually
checked to eliminate duplicate entries and those cases that were filed
prior to 2008.222
To identify those cases subject to a transfer motion, the dataset
was searched using the IPLC’s prepopulated search criteria by select-
ing “Case Event” and “Transfer Order.”223  Two other searches were
performed to confirm the initial result.  First, a search for “Motion to
Transfer Venue” was run on all patent cases filed in 2008 using Docket
Navigator, another web service that offers searchable access to a pat-
ent litigation database.224  Second, using the IPLC’s open search term
capability, two additional search queries were run: “Mo-
tion + Transfer” and “Motion + Venue.”225  Any duplicates were elimi-
nated, as were transfers between judges sitting in the same district and
221 PACER contains some inaccuracies as to what is counted as a patent case. See David L.
Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in
Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 244 (2008).  Some cases coded as patent-related in PACER
are not patent cases. See id. at 274 n.234.  Also, other cases properly coded as patent-related did
not involve infringement claims, but involved other patent-related claims, for example, correc-
tion of inventorship. See, e.g., Envtl. Packaging Techs. Ltd. v. Nelson, No. 4:08-cv-00130 (S.D.
Tex. dismissed Oct. 20, 2008) (mem.).
222 Cases that are transferred are coded as a new case in the transferee court.  This can
result in a duplicate entry if a case was filed in 2008 and also transferred that year, see, e.g.,
Riverbed Tech. Inc. v. Quantum Corp., No. 1:08-cv-00016-SLR (D. Del. filed Jan. 9, 2008) (trans-
ferred to the Northern District of California on March 7, 2008, resulting in a duplicate entry as
No. 3:08-cv-01314-WHA (N.D. Cal. filed March 10, 2008)), or if a case was filed prior to 2008 but
transferred in 2008, see, e.g., New Era Cap Co. v. Prinz Enters. LLC, No. 1:06-cv-00391-WMS-
HBS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15281 (W.D.N.Y. filed June 14, 2006) (transferred to the Eastern
District of New York on May 14, 2008, resulting in duplicate entry as No. 2:08-cv-02013-TCP-
ARL (E.D.N.Y. filed May 19, 2008) (case dismissed on Aug. 17, 2009)).
223 LEX MACHINA, supra note 87.
224 DOCKET NAVIGATOR, https://www.docketnavigator.com/entry/navigatorTourStart (last
visited Mar. 7, 2012).
225 The dataset thus includes transfer motions filed under §§ 1404(a), 1406, and 1407, and
motions to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, if the motion to dismiss requested transfer as an
alternative remedy.  In all of these scenarios, the plaintiff chose a particularly advantageous fo-
rum, and the defendant is challenging that selection and presenting an alternative.  Thus, the
motion was counted to capture the full spectrum of forum shopping behavior.
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cases in which a general scheduling order was entered giving the par-
ties a deadline by which to file a transfer motion but where a transfer
motion was never filed.
Relying on these datasets, three separate datasets were created:
(1) All Patent DJ Cases Filed in 2008; (2) All Patent DJ Cases Filed in
2008 Subject to Transfer, and (3) All Patent Infringement Cases
(NDJ) Filed in 2008 Subject to Transfer.  For all three datasets, the
following data were collected: (1) party names and docket number,
(2) filing date, (3) court in which the case was filed, (4) plaintiff
type,226 (5) defendant type,227 (6) suit type,228 and (7) copy of
complaint.
For the All Patent DJ Cases Filed in 2008 Subject to Transfer
dataset, the following additional data were collected: (1) whether the
declaratory judgment action was filed first; (2) whether the case was
transferred, stayed in the original forum, or the transfer was un-
resolved; and (3) if there was a motion to transfer, whether the motion
requested transfer to the Eastern District of Texas.
For the All Patent Infringement Cases (NDJ) Filed in 2008 Sub-
ject to Transfer dataset, the following additional data were collected:
whether the case was transferred, stayed in the original forum, or the
transfer was unresolved.  To determine whether a case was trans-
ferred, stayed in the original forum, or the transfer was unresolved,
human coders read each motion and order.
Unresolved cases include stipulated transfers, joint motions to
transfer, and cases that are voluntarily dismissed prior to motion reso-
lution by the party bringing the transfer motion, even if the party
seeking the transfer then proceeded in the parallel case.
Six declaratory judgment cases were coded as Contested Trans-
ferred Out despite the fact that the transfer motion was denied as
moot because the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the
accused infringer-plaintiff subsequently appeared in the case filed by
the patentee.229  For example, in Contour Products, Inc. v. Albecker,230
226 See infra Appendix B for an explanation of “plaintiff type” categories.
227 See infra Appendix B for an explanation of “defendant type” categories.
228 See infra Appendix B for an explanation of “suit type” categories.
229 See Adams Golf, Inc. v. Anthony J. Antonious Irrevocable Trust, No. 2:08-cv-00517,
2010 WL 2382596 (S.D. Ohio June 11, 2010); SAP AG v. OZRO, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-10623-WGY
(D. Mass. June 11, 2010); Avante Int’l Tech., Inc. v. Hart InterCivic, Inc., No. 08-832-GPM, 2009
WL 2431993 (S.D. Ill. July 31, 2009); Contour Prods., Inc. v. Albecker, No. 0:08-cv-60575-WPD
(S.D. Fla. June 1, 2009); Trophy Taker, Inc. v. Piersons, No. 9:08-CV-00128-DWM (D. Mont.
Dec. 5, 2008); Emine Tech. Co v. Aten Int’l Co., No. C 08-3122-PJH, 2008 WL 5000526 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 21, 2008).
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accused infringer Contour Products filed a complaint for declaratory
relief on April 22, 2008, against patentee Albecker in the Southern
District of Florida.231  On October 17, 2008, Albecker filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, or in the alternative, to trans-
fer the case to the Northern District of Illinois.232  On January 30,
2009, Albecker filed an infringement suit against Contour in the
Northern District of Illinois.233  On June 1, 2009, the Florida case was
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over Albecker, and Al-
becker’s motion to transfer was denied as moot.234  On July 17, 2009,
Contour filed an answer in the Illinois case.235  These DJ cases were
considered Contested Transferred Out because the transfer motion
was opposed, the court considered the motion and dismissed the DJ
case based on a determination that it was not the proper forum to
hear the case, and the accused infringer then proceeded in the paten-
tee’s forum.
One NDJ case, Vygon v. Rymed Technologies Inc.,236 was coded
as Contested Transferred Out where patentee Vygon filed an infringe-
ment action in Delaware five months after accused infringer Rymed
filed a declaratory judgment case against Vygon in the Middle District
of Tennessee.237  The court denied Vygon’s motion to transfer the case
to Delaware under § 1404(a).238  The Delaware court acknowledged
the Tennessee court’s order and dismissed its case so that the Tennes-
see case could proceed.239  This case was considered Contested Trans-
ferred Out because the transfer motion in Delaware was opposed, the
Delaware court considered the motion and dismissed the NDJ case
based on a determination that it was not the proper forum to hear the
case, and the accused infringer then proceeded in patentee’s forum.
230 Contour Prods., Inc. v. Albecker, No. 0:08-cv-60575-WPD (S.D. Fla June 1, 2009).
231 Plaintiff’s Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 1, Contour Prods., No. 0:08-cv-60575-
WPD.
232 Contour Prods., No. 0:08-cv-60575-WPD, slip. op. at 2.
233 Albecker v. Contour Prods., Inc., No. 09 C 0631, 2010, 2010 WL 1839803, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
filed May 3, 2010).
234 Contour Prods., No. 0:08-cv-60575-WPD, slip. op. at 12.
235 Answer and Counterclaims, Albecker, No. 1:09-cv-00631.
236 Vygon v. RyMmed Techs., Inc., No. 08-172-GMS, 2009 WL 856469 (D. Del. Mar. 31,
2009) (case filed Mar. 26, 2008).
237 Id. ¶ 2.
238 Id. ¶¶ 11–12.
239 Id. ¶¶ 14–15.
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Another NDJ case, Dimension-Polyant, Inc. v. Contender US,
Inc.,240 was coded as Contested Stay despite the fact that the motion to
transfer was denied as moot.  On May 27, 2008, the accused infringer
Contender brought a declaratory judgment action in Massachusetts
against the patentee Dimension.241  Dimension then filed an infringe-
ment case against Contender on June 24, 2008, in Connecticut and
also filed a motion to transfer the Massachusetts case to Connecti-
cut.242  The Massachusetts court granted Dimension’s transfer mo-
tion.243  The Connecticut court then denied Contender’s competing
motion to transfer to Massachusetts as moot.244  This NDJ case was
considered Contested Stay because the transfer motion out of Con-
necticut was opposed, the Connecticut court considered the motion,
and it denied the motion based on a determination that it was the
proper forum to hear the case.245
240 Dimension-Polyant, Inc. v. Contender US, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-00949-VLB (D. Conn. dis-
missed Feb. 23, 2009) (mem.).
241 Contender US, Inc. v. Dimension-Polyant, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-10887-WGY (D. Mass. Aug.
28, 2008) (mem.) (case filed May 27, 2008).
242 Dimension-Polyant, Inc. v. Contender US, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-00949-VLB; Motion to Dis-
miss or Transfer to the District Court of Connecticut, Contender US, Inc. v. Dimension-Polyant,
Inc., No. 1:08-cv-10887-WGY.
243 Contender US, Inc. v. Dimension-Polyant, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-10887-WGY.
244 Dimension-Polyant, Inc. v. Contender US, Inc., No. 3:08-cv-00949-VLB.
245 Id.
2012] OFFENSIVE VENUE 1111
APPENDIX B: PARTY CATEGORIES, DEFINITIONS, AND
METHODS OF IDENTIFICATION
A. Party Size and Type
For DJ cases, the size and type of party filing for declaratory
judgment and opposing declaratory judgment was recorded.  For NDJ
cases, in those cases where a transfer motion was filed, the size and
type of party filing the motion and opposing the motion was recorded.
Parties were divided into three categories: Large, Small, and
NPE.  Publicly traded companies and private companies with annual
revenues over $100 million were categorized as Large.  Subsidiaries of
such companies were also categorized as Large.  These parties were
identified using company websites and websites that track public com-
pany status.246  Private company status was confirmed via company
websites and estimated revenue was confirmed using websites that
contain business profile data.247
NPE was defined as a corporate patent enforcement entity that
neither practices nor seeks to develop its inventions.  A party was
coded NPE if the entity was described as a nonpracticing enforcement
or licensing entity, NPE, or troll by the entity’s website, court pleading
or order, SEC disclosure or description, Manta description, press ac-
count, or blog.248
All other parties were categorized as Small, including individuals,
nonprofits, and private companies whose revenue could not be
verified.
B. Additional Information Regarding Size and Type of Party
To give additional context to the data presented in this Article, it
is helpful to know more about who files for declaratory judgment,
and, in particular, who uses declaratory judgment actions to forum
shop.  These data may serve as a starting point for future research.
A further examination of the data presented in Tables 9 and 10
reveals that Large plaintiffs are more likely to use declaratory judg-
ment actions to forum shop and that declaratory judgment actions are
often used to forum shop against NPEs.  Using the data presented in
Tables 9 and 10, Table 14 compares the categories of plaintiffs that file
246 See, e.g., MANTA, http://www.manta.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2012); SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov (last visited Mar. 6, 2012); YAHOO! FINANCE, http://
www.finance.yahoo.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
247 See, e.g., MANTA, supra note 246; see also Chien, supra note 29, at 1612–14 (describing
similar identification methods).
248 See id.
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for declaratory judgment in general (n = 335) with the categories that
file for declaratory judgment subject to transfer motions (n = 86).
TABLE 14. DJ PLAINTIFF TYPE BY TRANSFER MOTION FILED
Percent of All Percent of all
Declaratory Number of Declaratory Judgment
DJ Plaintiff Number of Judgment Transfer Actions Subject to
Type249 Cases Filed Actions Motions Filed Transfer
Large 160 47.8% 58 67.4%
Small 175 52.2% 28 32.6%
Total 335 86
As can be seen from Table 14, Large and Small plaintiffs file for
declaratory judgment at approximately the same rate, but Large plain-
tiffs are significantly overrepresented in declaratory judgment cases
that are subject to transfer.250  This suggests that when Large plaintiffs
choose a forum using a declaratory judgment action, they are more
likely to aggressively forum shop for a forum that is particularly ad-
vantageous to them or disadvantageous to the defendant.  There are
at least two possible reasons for this result.  First, Large plaintiffs
could be forum shopping against weaker, smaller opponents.251  Sec-
ond, cases where transfer is an issue could involve high stakes, serious
disputes between well-funded litigious parties.252
By including data on defendants, a clearer picture emerges.  Ta-
ble 15 presents the number of declaratory judgment actions filed by
Large plaintiffs (n = 160), separated by defendant type: Large plaintiff
v. Small defendant, Large plaintiff v. NPE, and Large plaintiff v.
Large defendant.  These data are then compared to the corresponding
number of declaratory judgment suits filed by Large plaintiffs subject
to transfer (n = 58) to see if Large plaintiffs’ forum shopping activities
are targeted at specific opponents.
249 NPEs are never plaintiffs in declaratory judgment cases because, by definition, they do
not make any product that could be accused of infringing another’s patent. Id. at 1577–79.
250 This result is statistically significant with a p-value of less than 0.0005. See id. at 1603–04
n.167.
251 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1516 (“Forum-shopping might be in use by the
strong against the weak.”); see also Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 135, at 575–76 (arguing that
preliminary injunctions tend to be used by large firms hoping to impose financial distress on
smaller rivals).
252 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 1517 & n.22 (“The data confirm that trans-
ferred cases generally have a higher mean amount demanded and take longer to litigate.”).
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TABLE 15. DJ CASE PAIR BY TRANSFER MOTION FILED
Percent of all
Percent of All Number of Declaratory Judgment
Declaratory Judgment Transfer Actions Subject to
DJ Case Number of Actions Brought by Motions Transfer Brought by
Pair Cases Filed Large Plaintiffs Filed Large Plaintiffs
Large v. 36 22.5% 12 20.7%
Small
Large v. 35 21.9% 19 32.8%
NPE
Large v. 89 55.6% 27 46.5%
Large
Total 160 58
A number of observations can be made from Table 15.  First,
Large plaintiffs are primarily filing for declaratory relief against other
Large companies.  Large plaintiffs are also primarily using declaratory
judgment actions to forum shop against other Large companies.  Both
of these findings correlate well with other studies finding that, in pat-
ent litigation, large companies tend to sue other large companies.253
The data thus suggest that cases in which transfer is an issue tend to be
high stakes disputes between large, well-funded parties.  Second,
given that the percentage of Large v. Small cases stays approximately
the same from all declaratory judgment actions to declaratory judg-
ment actions subject to transfer, it does not appear that Large plain-
tiffs are forum shopping disproportionately more against smaller,
weaker defendants than other entities.  Third, Large plaintiffs may be
forum shopping disproportionately more against NPEs than other en-
tities.  Large plaintiffs may feel emboldened to engage in aggressive
forum shopping tactics because of a belief that NPEs are especially
likely to abuse the patent system254 or because, as a licensing entity, an
NPE’s residence for jurisdiction and venue purposes could plausibly
be in multiple jurisdictions.255  However, because the number of cases
in the dataset is small, the data are inconclusive and additional re-
search is needed to state conclusively that Large plaintiffs are more
253 See Chien, supra note 29, at 1603 (examining who initiates high-tech patent suits).
254 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 52, at 13 (“[T]here is concern that independent inventors
and licensing shops are especially likely to abuse the patent system by seeking licenses for weak
or invalid patents.”).
255 See supra Part I.B–C.3.  Because NPEs do not make or sell any products, they do not
have traditional manufacturing plants or sales offices to tie them to particular jurisdictions. See
supra notes 44, 139–41 and accompanying text.
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likely to use declaratory judgment actions to forum shop against
NPEs.256
We can, however, find statistically significant results when the
data are aggregated by defendant type only.  When the data are ex-
amined from the defendants’ perspective, they show that, no matter
what type of plaintiff brings suit, declaratory judgment actions are
often used to forum shop against an NPE.  Table 16 compares the
types of defendants defending declaratory judgment actions in general
(n = 335) with those defending declaratory judgment actions that are
subject to transfer motions (n = 86).
TABLE 16. DJ DEFENDANT TYPE BY TRANSFER MOTION FILED
Percent of All
Declaratory Number of Percent of Declaratory
DJ Defendant Number of Judgment Transfer Judgment Actions
Type Cases Filed Actions Motions Filed Subject to Transfer
Large 120 35.8% 33 38.4%
Small 174 51.9% 31 36%
NPE 41 12.2% 22 25.6%
Total 335 86
Table 16 shows that although NPEs defend 12.2% of declaratory
judgment suits overall, they are significantly overrepresented (25.6%)
in declaratory judgment actions that are subject to transfer.257  Declar-
atory judgment plaintiffs may feel emboldened to engage in aggressive
litigation tactics against NPEs because of a belief that NPEs are espe-
cially likely to abuse the patent system or because, as a licensing en-
tity, they could plausibly be in multiple jurisdictions.258
The data presented here provide further insight into who files for
declaratory judgment and who uses declaratory judgment actions to
forum shop.  Additional research should be performed to confirm and
elaborate upon the findings herein.
256 The result is not statistically significant, as the p-value is less than 0.15. See Chien, supra
note 29, at 1603–04 n.167.
257 This result is statistically significant. See id.
258 See supra note 255.
